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Promoting the development and dissemination of economic and 
political information has clearly become a common legal solution to a 
variety of public policy problems and market breakdowns. Applying 
the perspective of two important legal approaches, law and economics 
and civic virtue, 1 many scholars have demonstrated the theoretical 
and practical values of increased information in enhancing both public 
and private decisionmaking. 2 
The approach of law and economics can be traced back to early 
scholarship on private commercial and corporate markets. This litera-
ture envisioned a state of "perfect information" and zero transaction 
1. I use the term civic virtue, though this school can also be identified more generally as civic 
republicanism. 
2. See infra notes 20-66 and accompanying text. 
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costs as the ideal environment for facilitating "pareto-superior" ex-
changes and moving toward the economic ideal, "pareto optimality."3 
In order to improve imperfect markets, therefore, the early law-and-
economics literature often suggested that the government should step 
in, through either the adoption of legal rules requiring disclosure of 
information by private parties, the direct production of information by 
public sources, the creation of property rights in information, or some 
combination thereof.4 Similarly, in response to analogous concerns in 
the governmental sphere, law-and-economics scholars (especially 
many who are writing in the public choice tradition)5 have found that 
the public has a disincentive to gather political information due to seri-
ous free-rider problems. 6 The solution offered recently by some of 
these scholars, like many of their private law predecessors, has been to 
adopt a variety of legal doctrines that either increase the availability of 
information to the general public or improve the ability of private indi-
viduals and diffuse groups to collect such information. 7 
From a quite different perspective (though in some respects pursu-
ing oddly parallel goals), recent writings in the civic virtue tradition 
have applauded attempts to stimulate rational dialogue by expanding 
the amount of information available to the public and to actors in 
3. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. EcoN. 1, 8 (1960) (noting that with zero 
transaction costs, efficient distribution of resources is achievable regardless of how courts set the 
initial entitlement). Unfortunately, because information ordinarily has many of the qualities of a 
public good (namely, it is freely available to the public without possibility of exclusion of free 
riders and without increasing costs to producers) the private market frequently fails to stimulate 
adequate levels of information. See Grossman & Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally 
Efficient Markets, 70 AM. EcoN. REV. 393 (1980). 
4. As a consequence, the private free-riding tendency not to produce information could be 
minimized. See infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
The assumption that economic agents prefer to have better information if they can acquire it 
without cost is implicit in models determining efficient information structures and even in 
models of optimal search: In these models, the costs of information acquisition and trans-
mission and the costs of search are the only factors that limit the quest for more 
information. 
L. PHILLIPS, THE EcONOMJCS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION 12 (1988). 
5. Public choice is "the application of economic [models] to political decisionmaking." Fox, 
The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making: Antitrust as a Window, 61 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 560 n.17 (1986). 
6. Moreover, this incentive supposedly affects groups differently: the rise of so-called special 
interest groups in a variety of legislative and administrative contexts is said to be largely the 
result of asymmetry in information acquisition between more diffuse groups and more concen-
trated groups. Narrowly focused, more concentrated groups, according to this analysis, have an 
information/transaction-cost advantage in pursuing their political interests because they suffer 
from fewer and less-pronounced collective action problems. See infra notes 28-32 and accompa-
nying text. ' 
7. Toward this end, legal and other mechanisms would be adopted that ease disclosure of 
information into the public domain. Such mechanisms include strict enforcement of the first 
amendment, expansive disclosure requirements, and "liberal" techniques of statutory construc-
tion and judicial review. See infra notes 38-48 and accompanying text. 
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Congress and administrative agencies. This literature envisions delib-
eration on ethical norms as being enhanced by the ability of diverse 
groups to present their views in the political sphere, 8 thereby increas-
ing the variety of perspectives.9 
Despite these persuasive arguments, there are times when we 
might well prefer to be less informed. For example, many people 
would prefer not to know a major piece of personal information, the 
specific date of their own death. 10 This article explores the ramifica-
tions of this powerful insight in the arena of public decisionmaking by 
detailing the advantages which can flow from the structure of some 
political institutions that limit political information. 
In developing this argument, I will rely principally on the litera-
ture on political parties and party identification, suggesting that both 
the value and viability of parties depend on their ability to limit certain 
types of information and to channel information to centralized polit-
ical institutions. In this sense, the present analysis is a sequel to a 
prior article, in which I relied on the literature on political parties to 
highlight some of the benefits of political centralization and the poten-
tial costs of certain decentralizing reforms advanced in the civic virtue 
literature. 11 Here, I argue that if one focuses on questions of mass 
8. In particular, checks and balances, decentralized units of decisionmaking, and propor-
tional representation have been offered as beneficial techniques for "proliferating points of ac-
cess" to governmental deliberations, expanding the number and types of groups that are able to 
introduce their particular perspective into the public debate. See infra notes 60-65 and accompa-
nying text. 
9. Of course, in comparison to the classic law-and-economics perspective, civic virtue advo-
cates emphasize the value of information in terms of improving the ethical decisionmaking of 
public and private decisionmakers. As set forth below, rational dialogue is supposed to "make us 
think from the point of view of everyone" by elucidating differing viewpoints, perspectives, and 
backgrounds, forcing us to appreciate our differences and to feel empathy and respect for those 
who do not share our background and viewpoint. Under this framework, information is not 
simply a utilitarian exchange of price or similar information about goods and services; it encom-
passes the examination from different perspectives of the normative value of different life styles. 
From this intellectual free exchange and dialogue, which tracks many traditional liberal defenses 
of the first amendment, an agreement on social ends and an appreciation of private autonomy is 
supposed to be furthered. Thus, while law-and-economics scholars emphasize the value of infor-
mation in improving the instrumental ability of private actors to achieve or further their own 
preexisting goals, civic virtue scholars see the exchange of viewpoints as helping to shape those 
very goals. 
10. See, e.g., Fitts & Fitts, Ethical Standards of the Medical Profession, 297 ANNALS 17, 25 
(1955). In a quite different area, the law of evidence, courts routinely exclude information from 
admission on the grounds that its prejudicial effect "substantially outweighs" its probative value. 
See FED. R. Evm. 403. Needless to say, the list of information society might prefer individuals 
not to know is extensive. See, e.g., c. BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 21 
(1989) (summarizing numerous examples). 
11. See Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the 
Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 (1988) [hereinafter Fitts, Vices of Virtue]; see also 
Fitts, Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionary Notes on Civic Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1651 
(1988). While the political party approach has not been explored by civic virtue and law-and-
economics scholars, political parties appear to enjoy the strong support of "a large majority of 
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political organization and group dialogue, channeling information to 
central political institutions, rather than simply permitting its diffusion 
among the public, can be seen as a valuable tool in several different 
ways. In particular, limiting information can sometimes narrow and 
rationalize political choice, promote greater popular accountability 
(especially among the poor), stimulate group dialogue, and forge polit-
ical agreements. 12 Based on these observations, I will sketch four sep-
arate explanations (what I will crudely call models) of how less 
information can be beneficial. 
The first model suggests that more limited information can im-
prove the rationality of decisionmaking itself. In recent years, social 
psychologists have begun to examine the complex process through 
which decisionmakers evaluate new information and make decisions 
about appropriate action. This still-evolving and somewhat contro-
versial literature suggests that the use of certain simplifying devices, 
heuristic shortcuts which in effect exclude information and narrow 
choices, can improve decisionmaking.13 As outlined below, party 
identification, and party influence more generally, have served this role 
for the public, especially the poor, by ignoring certain types of political 
information and emphasizing others. 
The second model suggests that less information sometimes can 
further traditional utilitarian goals by helping to overcome various 
collective action problems. As numerous economists and political 
scientists have noted, many coirective action problems (in other words, 
many problems of group government organizations) stem from situa-
tions in which individuals' or groups' pursuit of their narrow self-in-
mainstream political scientists" concerned with government organization, see L. SABATO, THE 
PARTY'S JUST BEGUN: SHAPING PoLmCAL PARTIES FOR AMERICA'S FUTURE 2 (1988), and 
offer an important contrast to the usual law-and-economics and civic virtue perspectives. As a 
strong advocate of political parties, E.E. Schattschneider, once wrote, "modem democracy is 
unthinkable save in terms of the parties. As a matter of fact, the condition of the parties is the 
best possible evidence of the nature of any regime." E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERN-
MENT 1 (1942). While political parties probably enjoyed their greatest academic support in the 
1940s and 1950s, there has been renewed scholarly interest of late, in part for the reasons sug-
gested in this article. 
12. It should be noted that group dialogue in the political context often occurs in fundamen-
tally different ways from dialogue in the adjudicatory context. 
As developed below, part of the argument is based on the potential advantages of more cen-
tralized information systems. In this sense, limiting information means limiting (or failing to 
subsidize) information in one context as compared to another. At the same time, I also suggest 
that along certain dimensions dispersed information may have negative effects on an absolute 
level, regardless of whether resources used to develop information are transferred to a more 
centralized information structure. 
13. Analogous observations have been made in social science theory, philosophy, literary 
theory, and private law literature. See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text. 
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terest makes most or all parties worse off. 14 Government dominated 
by special interest groups is thought to create an important example of 
this difficulty. Although the traditional law-and-economics solution is 
to expand the ability of diffuse groups to acquire information, these 
problems also can be reduced by decreasing the ability of narrower 
interest groups and individual politicians to develop information inde-
pendently.15 Social and political structures that downplay certain in-
formation, especially strong political parties and party identification, 
have often helped overcome the influence of narrower constituencies 
iii this way. 
The third model suggests that less information can make it easier 
to reach political agreements and to overcome stalemates because ac-
tors with less information may avoid politically contentious issues. 
While confronting problems normally improves the political process, 
in some contexts less information can serve to remove intractable con-
troversies from the political agenda.16 For example, many budget 
problems and political party divisions appear to have resulted from 
our inability at times to prioritize among issues and to balance con-
frontation with avoidance in this way. 
Finally, as a normative, ethical matter, vagueness about a group's 
14. See generally R. HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982); M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OP COL· 
LECTIVE ACTION (1965). 
15. The problem and solution can thus be conceptualized as a prisoners' dilemma, the classic 
game-theory predicament in which two cohorts in crime are individually offered a reduced sen-
tence if they squeal on their compatriot. Although they will both be better off if they both 
stonewall their interrogators, the private incentive is to squeal, disadvantaging both. While the 
usual method for avoiding this perverse incentive is to reach a prior agreement not to accept the 
interrogator's offer (thereby allowing private and group incentives to converge), the alternative 
social-intervention technique hypothesized here is not to allow the interrogator's offer to be com-
municated in the first place, that is, to keep both the prisoners ignorant of what appears to be 
their immediate self-interest, thereby furthering their joint long-term interests. In this way, igno-
rance would promote both efficiency and cooperative goals. Needless to say, this approach 
would be valuable primarily where high transaction costs and strategic behavior preclude the 
parties reaching a prior enforceable agreement, the normal law-and-economics/public choice so-
lution to this problem. 
An analogous issue can arise in the antitrust context, where market actors likely to enter into 
a price-fixing conspiracy are restricted in communicating information about certain market activ-
ity. See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969); American Column & Lum-
ber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921). See generally R. HARDIN, supra note 14, at 131. 
16. Examining such problems can cause political divisions that, in retrospect, almost every-
one would agree should have been avoided. As an example of this view, Rawls has suggested 
that the willingness to accept certain issues as beyond public purview is a precondition to the 
stability of many liberal states. See Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 
PHIL. & Pua. AFF. 223, 251 (1985). Information limitations can serve an analogous function by 
downplaying certain issues. Cf. P. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY 58 
(1986) (increases in number of participants increases the probability of a voting cycle). To some 
degree, this may be viewed as a philosophical or ideological prisoners' dilemma, and thus, a 
variant of the second model. In this case, however, the prisoners' dilemma is ordinarily viewed 
as overcoming ideological stalemate, rather than avoiding the inefficiency of interest group 
government. 
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or an individual's place within the political system can serve to create 
a real-world veil of ignorance - a state of imperfect information about 
our own or other groups' place in society that can reduce self-interest 
in social decisionmaking processes. In this way, vagueness about the 
political position of different groups can promote public acceptance of 
and desire for resource distribution, help stimulate a rational dialogue, 
and even further a political consensus.17 Indeed, the existence of a 
greater historical consensus on separation-of-powers issues at various 
points in our history, I suggest below, can be understood in terms of 
this analysis and the viability of a strong two-party system.18 Con-
versely, the recent proliferation of separation-of-powers confrontations 
can be seen as partly resulting from the breakdown of this process and 
from the effect of doctrinal changes supported in some of the civic 
virtue and law-and-economics literatures. 
My purpose in explicating these circumstances is not to suggest 
that less information is presumptively a good thing. Except for the 
resource cost of acquiring the information, dialogue and exchange of 
information 'ordinarily improve deliberative as well as utilitarian 
processes. 19 There are clear advantages to open discussion, and dan-
gers in information limitation, such as political tyranny, that need not 
be elaborated here. Needless to say, my goal is not to challenge widely 
held beliefs about the first amendment or the value of free intellectual 
exchange in our society. 
Rather, I have two objectives. First, based largely (but not exclu-
sively) on the political party literature, I propose to develop these four 
models, or ideal types, demonstrating how the organization of political 
institutions can be beneficial (in terms of social goals with which many 
would agree) by downplaying various types of public information. I~ 
this sense, my purpose is academic: to explicate and understand sev-
eral analyses of various types of information that are different from the 
17. Significantly, this limitation on information improves decisionmaking in a different way 
than civic virtue theory envisions. Civic virtue writers conceive of the decisionmaking capabili-
ties of political actors as being improved by discussion - even confrontation - with opposing 
viewpoints and perspectives. In other words, our ability to undertake ethical deliberation is im-
proved by increasing our world of informati9n. To this extent, civic virtue seems to view polit-
ical actors as more inherently virtuous and empathetic - a resource that can be tapped and 
motivated through discussion with other participants. In the circumstances noted here, however, 
it may be that our capacities for deliberation over social ends are improved by limiting our infor-
mational world - by veiling the real world applications of our decisions. See infra notes 173-77 
and accompanying text, 
18. See infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text, 
19. Nothing said here denies that the insights of civic virtue and law and economics offer 
powerful critiques of legal institutions and useful avenues for reform, Indeed, as suggested be-
low, many of my observations are quite compatible with classical economic theory as it would 
likely be applied to the analysis of party-based political structures. 
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normal law-and-economics or civic virtue insights about public insti-
tutions. Although the United States has never had strong parties as 
compared to countries such as Great Britain, historically its parties 
have performed these functions to some extent and perhaps would 
have to a greater degree had they been stronger or structured differ-
ently. Thus, quite apart from the factual issue of how significant these 
effects are in a particular context, they represent alternative ap-
proaches that need to be weighed in policy analysis. 
My second objective is more practical: to use these analyses to 
understand and, in part, defend several government reforms that di-
verge from some current legal trends. These reforms are limited de-
partures from the usual civic virtue and law-and-economics 
approaches and from the general presumption in favor of information 
proliferation. They include changed rules on campaign contributions 
to individual politicians; reduced access to administrative agencies and 
Congress; and centralization devices such as party identification and 
party conventions. These changes would reduce support for dispersed 
sources of information while, in other cases, strengthening the com-
parative informational advantages and accountability of certain cen-
tral institutions. Although giving institutions or individuals the power 
to decide how information should be shaped can create serious dan-
gers, the way political institutions are organized can channel informa-
tion to the advantage of the society as a whole. 
Organizationally, the discussion will proceed as follows. In Parts I 
and II, I shall summarize the law-and-economics and civic virtue per-
spectives on the value of political information and their proposals for 
reforms in the political process that would stimulate greater political 
information. These two literatures are often viewed as distinct in their 
objectives: one seeking to improve means/ends rationality; the other 
seeking to improve goal formation - a function that I loosely describe 
as normative, ethical, or value-based. Nevertheless, they share some 
common practical approaches where information is concerned. In 
Part Ill, I shall discuss the instrumental advantages to limiting polit-
ical information, focusing particularly on the role of political party 
identification and party organization generally in promoting rational 
decisionmaking (section III.A), overcoming the perverse influence of 
special interest groups (section 111.B), and surmounting political stale-
mate (section 111.C). These sections cover, respectively, models one, 
two, and three described above. Finally, in Part IV I shall explore th~ 
normative value of more limited information, based partly on the ap-
proach of Rawls' veil of ignorance (model four). This Part explores 
such issues as delegation of legislative authority, separation-of-powers 
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confrontations, and pluralist versus constitutional decisionmaking, all 
in the context of the breakdown of political parties. 
Clearly, each model focuses on a different type of information -
information about the often confusing range of diverse political op-
tions; about constituent or pork-barrel projects; about potentially divi-
sive and destructive political debates; and about the impact on 
different groups of alternative social policies. In each case, however, 
strong political parties can be seen as performing a positive role in 
reducing such information. Moreover, while we probably cannot cre-
ate strong parties, and indeed would not want to in certain contexts, 
some current proposed changes in government structure, which I will 
explore in each section, may be helpful in furthering the beneficial as-
pects of the strong party tradition. 
I. THE VALUE OF INFORMATION IN PUBLIC DECISIONMAKING 
UNDER THE LAW-AND-ECONOMICS MODEL 
A. General Problems with Limited Information 
Perhaps the most fundamental tenet of law and economics is the 
autonomy of individual choice.20 Taking the individual's valuation of 
personal utilities as a given, law-and-economics scholars generally 
seek to fashion various social or legal decisions that will maximize so-
cial welfare, in either a Pareto-superior or a Kaldor-Hicks sense.21 
While the precise mental processes through which individuals arrive at 
their market choices are seldom the focus oflaw-and-economics analy-
sis, this literature does recognize that preferences, as well as the indi-
vidual's ability to locate avenues for pursuing them, are dependent 
upon the information available to the individual. 
Unfortunately, because perfectly functioning markets assume per-
fect information, the law-and-economics scholars face a· significant 
20. The discussion that follows, like the description in the succeeding section on civic virtue, 
seeks to sketch broad outlines of a literature in which there are obviously many different strands, 
some of which may be in tension with my general summary. For this reason, I claim only to be 
establishing an "ideal type," which serves to capture many of the central insights and directions 
of a literature and can be helpful in understanding and comparing the perspectives of different 
approaches. See M. WEBER, EcONOMY AND SOCIETY 9 (1978) [hereinafter M. WEBER, ECON-
OMY AND SOCIETY]; M. WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 91-112 (E. 
Shils & H. Finch eds. 1949) [hereinafter M. WEBER, METHODOLOGY]. 
21. See B. ACKERMAN, EcONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW xi-xiv (1975); A.M. 
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcONOMICS 7-10 (2d ed. 1989); R. POSNER, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LA w 11-17 (3d ed. 1986). Of course, there is an extensive literature ques-
tioning whether or to what extent this is an appropriate basis for decisionmaking. See, e.g., 
Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 485 (1980); Kennedy, Cost-
Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Programs: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387, 401-21 (1981); 
Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REv. 592 
(1985). 
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problem in ensuring that markets produce information sufficient to 
justify deference to individual choice. Information is often a public 
good, that is to say, an item freely available to the public without pos-
sibility of exclusion.22 Due to free-rider problems, such goods are 
likely to be produced suboptimally, absent government intervention. 
Since it is often difficult to exclude information in economic and polit-
ical markets from free use by others, there is a disincentive to produce 
it at appropriate levels.23 
The early law-and-economics literature sought to grapple with this 
problem primarily in the commercial law context, pointing out the 
large efficiency loss due to imperfect information, and the resulting 
creation of suboptimal markets in commercial transactions and corpo-
rate stock. As a remedy, several government interventions were pro-
posed for stimulating the production and dissemination of 
information, including having direct public production, requiring bar-
gaining parties to disclose material conditions, proxy statements, la-
bels, and warranties, and assigning property rights to the least cost 
22. There are two additional problems, one technical and one philosophical, which are not 
explored in depth in this article. First, as a technical matter, the individual knows whether the 
information is valuable only after she expends the effort to acquire it. Logically, neither the 
society nor the individual can make a prior utility calculation that the information should have 
been secured, or, more broadly, make a judgment with respect to a class of decisions that a given 
amount of information should have been acquired, or a specific system used to acquire it, without 
first acquiring the information. Any judgment about proper resource allocations for information 
must be imperfect, based on predictions on the value of the information for that or similarly 
situated persons. Thus, inductive judgments about information acquisition are inherently imper-
fect. Only after obtaining the information - making the decision - can one know whether it 
was justified. See generally H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON 
CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1968). 
Second, apart from these technical problems, there is a philosophical problem with informa-
tion acquisition. To the extent that the acquisition of the information changes the nature of the 
individual, it may be philosophically impossible, even understanding the "value" of the informa-
tion, to know whether or not it should be acquired under an economic model. The answer 
depends upon which individual - the one with or without the information - is making the 
decision. If the individual's views on the value of the information change, it is logically impossi-
ble to determine whose autonomous preferences should be respected. See D. PARFIT, REASONS 
AND PERSONS 219-43 (1984); Ainslie, Beyond Microeconomics: Conflict Among Interests in a 
Multiple Self as a Determinant of Value, in THE MULTIPLE SELF 133 (J. Elster ed. 1986); Kel-
man, Choice and Utility, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 769, 779. For this reason, one's philosophy of 
information acquisition is directly relevant to whatever structure is employed for government 
organization. 
These problems obviously may be more significant with respect to some issues than to others. 
As one moves from micromanagement questions, such as consumer search strategies, to issues 
concerning alternative states of political organization, both of these difficulties may be exacer-
bated. The more fundamental the question being researched, the more varied the potential states 
of the world and the more likely the individual in that new state is to be different from the 
decisionmaker in the existing world. 
23. See Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inventio11, in THE 
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (Na· 
tional Bureau of Economic Research 1962); Arrow, Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis, 
64 AM. EcON. REV. l (1974). 
April 1990) Veils of Ignorance 927 
avoider.24 
This perspective was later extended to the public sphere in order 
better to understand the general problems of political organization and 
the perverse advantages enjoyed by certain groups in influencing pub-
lic policy.25 As to the organizational problems, since politics and the 
exercise of power are almost necessarily group activities, information 
usually becomes important only to the degree that the group with 
which one is associated is able to assimilate it and exercise influence. 
As a result, the public good/collective action problem inherent in the 
information market is compounded by the collective action problem of 
group political organization: "[I]gnorance is rational because the 
costs of obtaining a collective good are shared by many, and no one 
individual's contribution ... is thus likely to make a difference."26 
According to this model, therefore, "one can expect individuals to be 
24. See, e.g., 0. WILLIAMSON, THE EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985); 0. 
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES (1975). An extensive literature has arisen regard-
ing how various institutional frameworks can economize and facilitate greater exchanges of in-
formation. As a general matter, this literature reflects a careful balancing of the need to create 
sufficient incentives for individuals to generate information against the problems created when 
information, once created, is not available. Since the processes of bargaining to acquire informa-
tion and of knowing initially how much information to bargain for are inherently imperfect, a 
strict property limitation on information would be counterproductive. 
25. As in the private sphere, information is advantageous in the public context because it 
facilitates individuals' and groups' ability to identify their interests and to use governmental in-
tervention to promote these interests. 
Of course, some legal scholars view the public sphere, in contrast to the private market, as a 
fundamentally redistributive enterprise, rather than as an efficiency-enhancing process. Accord-
ing to this rent-seeking model, information in the public sphere tends to be purely redistribu-
tional, with the benefits of action predicated merely on one's comparative ability to understand 
and press one's interest in competition with one's opponents for the same resources. For descrip-
tions, see Macey, Competing Economic Views of the Constitution, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 50 
(1987). Macey claims: 
[T]he same invisible hand that leads to wealth creation in private market transactions causes 
massive economic inefficiencies and social instability when it is set loose in the political 
sphere. . • . As a consequence of the government's ability to coerce, rationally self-interested 
citizens have incentives to organize into special interest group coalitions in order to demand 
regulation that makes them better off. 
Id. at 57; see also Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 123, 133 (1989) ("For some, the only public purpose worthy of respect 
seems to be the elimination of the public sector itself."); Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and 
Economics -And the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341, 342 (1988) ("Scholars in all 
three traditions [in law and economics] are skeptical about the legitimacy of legislative and bu-
reaucratic processes and share a confidence in the value of market outcomes"). For examples, 
see TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (J. Buchanan, R. Tollison & G. Tul-
lock eds. 1980); Crain & Tollison, Constitutional Change in an Interest-Group Theory of Govern-
ment, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1979); Crain & Tollison, The Executive Branch in the Interest 
Group Perspective, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 555 (1979). In other words, because of the coercive powers 
of the state, information is more likely to be a zero-sum game, a process of rent-seeking, with 
negligible social value. But cf. Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the 
Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. EcoN. REV. 561 (1971) (discussing the redistributive and 
efficiency consequences of information in private markets). 
26. Oppenheimer, Public Choice and Three Ethical Properties of Politics, 45 PUB. CHOICE 
241, 243 (1985). 
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relatively uninformed about and unmotivated by the collective conse-
quences of their political behavior."27 
Beyond this general disincentive to service adequate levels of infor-
mation, the differential access to information among competing groups 
also presents problems in political organization. As a variety of schol-
ars have detailed, discrete groups with a high degree of interest in spe-
cific outcomes often enjoy organizational advantages because 
information is costly to obtain and because such groups enjoy lower 
transaction costs. More diffuse groups, on the other hand, often have 
free-rider problems in obtaining the information, even though as 
groups they may care more about the particular outcome.2s 
According to the economic analysis, moreover, this differential ac-
cess often disadvantages large segments of society, even though most, 
if not all, citizens are part of at least one special interest group in one 
political context or another. In the first place, the organizing advan-
tages of special interest groups often outweigh the need to ·counteract 
any majoritarian bias in our political system. According to the eco-
nomic model, they serve to supply a greater advantage to narrow 
groups than is justified by the weight of their interests. 29 More impor-
tantly, it is argued, because virtually all of us are part of both special 
interest groups and diffuse groups in different contexts, many groups 
27. Id. at 245; see also Macey, supra note 25, at 77: 
As a general matter, citizens will have little incentive to inform themselves of the nature of 
the various statutes passed in the ordinary course of a legislative session because the cost of 
such legislation is lower than the cost of acquiring such information. And even if the costs 
of acquiring information about a proposed statute are low relative to the effects of the stat-
ute, the costs of organizing an effective political coalition to oppose such a statute is suffi-
ciently high that expending resources to discover the economic effects of ordinary laws 
remains irrational for the ordinary citizen. 
28. This important observation about the effect of group size on group activity was made 
many years ago by Mancur Olson. M. OISON, supra note 14. This insight has since been ex-
panded into a richer typology of possible incentives to group action. See, e.g., R. HARDIN, supra 
note 14; M. HAYES, LoBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL MARKETS 64-
127 (1981); J. WIISON, PoLmCAL ORGANIZATIONS 327-45 (1973); Wilson, The Politics of Reg-
ulation, in THE PoLmcs OF REGULATION 357, 357-72 (J. Wilson ed. 1980). For empirical 
evidence, see, for example, J. FEREJOHN, PORK BARREL POLITICS: RIVERS AND HARBORS LEG· 
ISLATION, 1947-1968 (1974); C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS (1977); G. McCONNELL, 
PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN PEMOCRACY (1966). According to this analysis, the "ten-
dency of our factional politics to redistribute wealth from large groups to small ones [may have] 
produced the opposite of the oppressive majorities that the Framers feared." Bruff, Legislative 
Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 207, 216 (1984); see also Ackerman, 
Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713, 745-46 (1985); Posner, Economics, Politics, 
and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 266 (1982). 
29. In other words, the power of special interest groups does not further Kaldor-Hicks "effi-
ciency" in government, but may do the exact opposite: it may bias the system beyond what the 
"preferences" of the narrow group warrant. See Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 
BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971); Mashaw, supra note 25, at 127 ("analysts in the 'interest 
group' tradition predict that governmental programs will be too large, directed at the wrong ends 
and perversely redistributional"). See generally M. OISON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NA-
TIONS (1982). 
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in our society are disadvantaged by this process. In effect, special in-
terest government can often create a type of social prisoners' dilemma, 
where most citizens are made worse off by pursuing their self-interest 
as part of many successful special interest groups.30 In its extreme 
form, members of Congress or other political actors enter into explicit 
or implicit agreements to support a general system of legislation enact-
ing different group projects, a process described as "universalism."31 
30. See generally M. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON EsrABLISH-
MENT (1977).- Technically, this is supposed to create a prisoners' dilemma deadweight loss, 
whereby the majority of citizens end up paying for more public services than their demand would 
justify, since they pay for their own interest groups' projects (and those of other groups) with 
higher tax dollars. This system is supposedly inefficient in a Kaldor-Hicks sense because, at least 
in a perfect world, most of us could be made better off by not initiating the distributive scheme 
and retaining some previously spent tax dollars. Macey explains it this way: 
Since most groups expect to be net losers from a pervasive system of special interest group 
activities, these groups have a strong incentive to enact constitutional rules that raise the 
cost of rent seeking generally - even if doing so means forgoing a certain measure of 
favorable legislation later on. The costs of giving up this favorable legislation are out-
weighed by the benefits of being protected from the expense of paying for the wealth trans-
fers that go to others. 
Macey, supra note 25, at 73-74; see also Aranson, Gellhom & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative 
Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982); Bruff, supra note 28, at 216 ("When groups compete 
for legislation, each has an incentive to demand its private benefits, even though the net result of 
the process is a welfare loss to all."); McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the 
Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 118 (1987). 
31. Of course, it is possible to argue, contrary to the textual thesis, that a system of political 
universalism, where each interest group is more likely to be assured its piece of the political pie, 
protects the lot of the worst off, and is thus defensible on redistributive grounds. Although 
intellectually intriguing and undoubtedly true in particular cases, this argument appears factually 
problematic in the United States today, at least according to the public choice perspective. 
According to this analysis, universalism is supposed to promote equality by minimizing the 
possibility that any one group is left out of the ruling political coalition - in other words, by 
improving the position of what would be the worst-off group in a majority rule system. And 
while protecting the group that would have been worst off may reduce 'the size of the overall pie, 
in universalism all participants may be willing to buy into the agreement because they do not 
know ex ante whether they will be in that group. See Miller, Pluralism and Social Choice, 77 
AM. POL. Set. REV. 734, 737 (1983) ("In a pluralist society, crosscut by many cleavages and 
partitioned into a multiplicity of preference clusters, political satisfaction is distributed much 
more equally."); cf THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 62 (J. Madison) (P. Ford ed. 1898) (where there 
is "a greater variety of parties and interests," it is "less probable that a majority of the whole will 
have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens"). 
In this sense, universalism could be rationalized using a type of Rawlsian veil-of-ignorance 
analysis, whereby everybody is willing to accept fewer social resources in order to improve the 
position of the worst-off group (which might be them), and to ensure the continuation of the 
political distributive system. See Rawls, supra note 16; Barry, Is Democracy Special?, in PHILOS-
OPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 155, 179 (P. Laslett & J. Fishkins eds. 1979); Weingast, A Ra-
tional Choice Perspective in Congressional Norms, 23 AM. J. POL. Set. 245 (1979). Since pursuit 
of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is not necessarily consistent with Rawls' "difference principle," the 
resulting system may violate norms of efficiency under public choice models, but comport with 
some sense of political morality. The reason the system is politically acceptable is simply that no 
group knows ex ante who will be the worst off. 
Unfortunately, this argument succeeds only if one views universalism as protecting the worst 
off in society, as distinguished from those who happen to lose in a particular political coalition 
game. According to many observers, however, the losers in political majoritarian politics tend 
not to be disproportionately the worst off in society, but rather simply interest groups who are 
not part of the majority coalition. See R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 133 
(1956); Ackerman, supra note 28, at 745-46; Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 
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For this reason, despite the benefits of special interest group influence, 
such as facilitating greater pluralism and perhaps greater dialogue, the 
public choice analysis suggests that our current political system has 
probably tilted too far in their direction. 32 
B. The Influence of Special Interest Groups in Public Law 
The greater ability of concentrated groups to secure information 
has consequences in two different political and legal contexts, which 
are related but sometimes have been treated separately in the litera-
MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1190-91 (1977). See generally Fitts, Vices of Virtue, supra note 11, at 1579-
84. To the degree that many different groups tend to be winners and losers in different 
majoritarian coalitions, there would likely be a social advantage by limiting the universalistic 
cycle. 
32. To be sure, it might be suggested that universalism (and interest group pluralism gener-
ally) is beneficial, despite its inefficiencies, because it furthers resource redistribution within a 
progressive taxation system. Ultimately, however, this argument appears to falter on factual 
grounds, at least according to the economic perspective. 
To put the thesis in its clearest form: interest group pluralism supposedly creates an overpro· 
duction of government resources by ensuring that the important actors on a particular issue are 
disproportionately those who benefit - the special interest groups - while the diffuse groups 
who pay the taxes are less organized. Assuming the tax system is both exempt from this interest 
group process and is progressive, universalism would thereby serve to create a bias in favor of 
redistribution. While a costless redistributive system would do more, within our current political 
environment where we must generate the political will to redistribute, pluralism would facilitate 
redistribution. Thus, some might argue, it is appropriate in certain instances to redistribute 
through pluralism, recognizing there will be some deadweight loss, but a redistributive advan· 
tage. Cf. Markovits, Duncan's Do Nots: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Determination of Legal 
Entitlements, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1169, 1174-77 (1984) (positive distributive impacts may out-
weigh concerns for efficiency). 
This defense of pluralism, it should be noted, differs from the traditional pluralist claim that 
most interests would be represented within a pluralist community, ensuring that the pluralist 
compromise would adequately reflect a legitimate accommodation among existing parties. See 
infra note 93. As noted above, the political economy literature has demonstrated persuasively 
the existence of pervasive collective action problems that undermine this analysis: some groups 
are not part of, or are at a market disadvantage in, pluralist politics. See supra note 28 and 
accompanying text. The above analysis suggests, rather, that, given a preexisting redistributive 
tax structure, some differential distribution may exist, but is "ethically" beneficial. While the 
relevant constituencies are included - those who wish distribution - there is a veil of ignorance 
with respect to those groups who are likely to pay, or at least their costs have already been 
established. 
Unfortunately, while intriguing, the argument ultimately seems factually problematic. As 
numerous scholars have observed, wealthier groups often have an organizational advantage in 
pluralist politics; the poor are often the diffuse group that is kept out of the pluralist distributive 
debate. See THE BIAS OF PLURALISM (W. Connolly ed. 1969); K. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, 
ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 87, 395-403 (1986). Moreover, the dis· 
persion of political responsibility endemic to pluralist politics can confuse the public, especially 
the poor and less educated. See Burnham, The Turnout Problem, in ELECTIONS AMERICAN 
STYLE 97, 131-33 (A. Reichley ed. 1987). Finally, and most importantly, there is evidence that 
the tax system, especially during times of so-called "normal" politics, when numerous tax loop· 
holes are secured, is not exempt from this pluralist bias. See G. Cox, M. Mccubbins & B. Wein-
gast, Congress and the Distributive Tendency in Tax Policy (unpublished manuscript on file with 
author); McClure and Zodrow, Treasury I and the Tax Reform Act of 1986: The Economics and 
Politics of Tax Reform, 1 EcoN. PERSP. 37, 37-38 (1987). A government which makes decisions 
through a pluralist process in both tax and expenditure contexts cannot claim this nonnative 
defense. 
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ture. The first is electoral. Special interest groups, because they tend 
to be more concentrated, are supposed to have disproportionate ad-
vantages in determining their interests on specific issues, securing the 
information with respect to those interests, and notifying political rep-
resentatives about their desires. 33 In effect, they enjoy reduced trans-
action costs in securing the information necessary to engage in 
electoral political action. More diffuse groups experience serious col-
lective action problems in. organizing institutions for the purpose of 
securing and delivering information necessary to pursue their electoral 
positions. 34 
A second and related context in which special interest groups are 
said to exercise disproportionate influence over government behavior 
occurs in the formulation and implementation stages of government 
decisions. 3s In such cases, 36 government actors vested with suppos-
edly final decisionmaking authority (such as Congress or the Presi-
dent) find that.their decisions or the implementation of their decisions 
in administrative agencies can be perverted l?y special interest groups 
that have a marJied advantage in affecting the execution of broad di-
rectives or mandates within the bureaucracy.37 
33. See K. SCHOLZMAN & J. TIERNEY, supra note 32. 
34. Id. 
35. See Bruff, supra note 28, at 244; B. OWEN & R. BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION 
GAME: STRATEGIC USE OF THE ADMINISfRATIVE PROCESS 1-13 (1978); CASE STUDIES IN 
REGULATION: REVOLUTION AND REFORM 7-10 (L. Weiss & M. Klass eds. 1981). For the 
classic view on interest group government, see T. Low1, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969) and 
Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 295 (1987). 
36. As a theo
0
retical matter, some political science literature analyzes these latter situations as 
agency-principal problems, in which the principal (the President or Congress) has difficulty en-
suring that its subordinate - the administrative age.ncy - is fulfilling its mandate. See McCub-
bins, Noll, & Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. 
EcoN. & ORG. 243, 247 (1987). According to this analysis, special interest groups often have a 
marked advantage in perverting the "principal's" intent, especially in light of the difficulty in 
monitoring the complex decisions emanating from the administrative bureaucracy, and increas-
ing the costs of monitoring by the principal. 
37. Indeed, a variety of scholars have also pointed out the independent influence of govern-
ment agencies in perverting implementation of government programs. Because of their differen-
tial access to information regarding the facts of the substantive programs over which they have 
responsibility, they are thought to skew the policy agenda in favor of maximizing the agency 
budget or furthering its bureaucrats' career goals. See R. ARNOLD, CONGRESS AND THE BU-
REAUCRACY (1979); G. BENVENISTE, BUREAUCRACY 71-111 (1977); D. MUELLER, PUBLIC 
CHOICE 156-70 (1979); W. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
(1971). 
Obviously, the two circumstances are related: the influence of special interest groups in the 
formulation and execution of policy is in part due to their powers in affecting the initial political 
judgment. Nevertheless, control over information and contacts can be important in legislation 
and administration for reasons unrelated to the electoral influence of special interest groups; 
administrative and executive actors may be dependent on contacts and knowledge obtained by 
those most knowledgeable in the area. In addition, those most likely to pay attention to what 
administrative and legislative officials are doing, and to alert the public or special interest groups 
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C. Solutions to the Special Interest Group Problem 
To overcome· the lack of informational parity among diffuse and 
concentrated groups in these various contexts, and to surmount the 
general lack of incentive to generate political information, several 
scholars, relying on law-and-economics theories, have defended a vari-
ety of political institutions and legal mechanisms that would expand 
political information.38 The most important is disclosure of govern-
ment activities, on the ground that enforcement and disclosure will 
improve diffuse groups' oversight of governmental activities. Because 
obtaining information is more costly for diffuse groups, and because 
monitoring government is more difficult for such entities, it becomes 
important for information to be available at no cost. "By supporting 
the freedoms of speech and press," it is suggested, "one can increase 
the likely caliber of [rationality] in political action by increasing the 
availability of free and relatively inexpensive information. "39 While 
"[i]ndividuals may not seek information, [they] may process it if it is 
very easily acquired."40 
A similar analysis has also been used to support recent law-and-
economics proposals to transform the nature of statutory construction 
and judicial review.41- Like the first amendment scholarship, the as-
sumption of this approach is that "citizens have poor information 
about the actions of legislators" and "legislators have few incentives to 
when policies diverge from what was intended, can be important and powerful groups to these 
officials. 
38. To be sure, there are cases where the economics literature recognizes that less informa-
tion can be advantageous even apart from the costs of generating it. See, e.g., Hirshleifer, supra 
note 25, at 568. In addition, it should be recognized that market participants who possess less 
information can sometimes rely on the superior knowledge of others. See Schwartz & Wilde, 
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of lmpelfect Information, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 638 
(1979); McKelvey & Ordeshook, Information, Electoral Equilibria, and the Democratic Ideal, 48 
J. PoL. 909 (1986) (arguing that under certain conditions uninformed voters can rely on polls of 
public opinion instead of candidates' declared positions to decide for whom to vote). Indeed, 
some of the arguments set forth in this article and in the traditional party literature are consistent 
with these observations. 
39. Oppenheimer, supra note 26, at 253. 
40. Id. Thus, the first amendment and disclosure requirements regarding legislative and ad· 
ministrative operations can all serve to increase the availability of such information, and, in so 
doing, supposedly improve the relative ability of diffuse groups to participate effectively in 
government. 
41. The subject of statutory construction has enjoyed a resurgence in recent years, much of it 
with the goal of using varying techniques to improve judicial decisionmaking. See, e.g., Eskridge, 
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987); Eskridge, Public Values in 
Statutory Constructin, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1007 (1989). Some interesting scholarship, however, 
especially that of Jon Macey and Susan Rose-Ackerman, suggests that interpreting legislntion 
according to its publicly stated goals can overcome the informational disadvantages of diffuse 
groups in overseeing legislative deliberations. See Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legisla-
tion Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); 
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 25. 
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reveal deals that would not be obvious to superficial observers."42 To 
overcome this deficiency, "[t]he aim of judicial review should ... be to 
make legislators more responsible to the electorate by assuring that 
information about legislative bargains is more likely available, [im-
proving the public's] capacity to monitor the output of congressional 
bargains."43 Courts should thus construe statutes according to their 
"public" explanations, rather than according to their technical terms 
or deals that were supposedly formulated behind the scenes, thereby 
serving to equalize the ability of diffuse groups and more concentrated 
groups to oversee legislative deliberations. In this way, statutory con-
struction would improve the informational abilities of the diffuse pub-
lic to monitor government, helping to minimize the organizational 
advantages of special interest groups.44 
Finally, a related analysis has been applied by administrative law 
scholars to the monitoring of government bureaucracies. As noted 
above, although delegation is intrinsic to operations in the Post-New 
Deal state, execution will necessarily involve a deviation from the ini-
tial legislative judgment. This deviation, moreover, can be affected dif~ 
ferentially by special interest groups. 45 While the proposed solutions 
to this problem have been varied, many scholars express a common 
approach and purpose: to increase the oversight of administrative 
agencies so as to counteract the differential informational advantage of 
special interest groups. The most important such proposed technique 
is to make decisionmaking by administrative agencies more open to 
the public through "hard look" judicial review, enhanced procedures 
under the Administrative Procedures Act, and supplementation of in-
tervention rights.46 A variation on this theme is to improve the acces-
sibility of executive information to legislative review by expanding the 
requirements of the Freedom of Information Act, and, perhaps, by 
expanding legislative oversight.47 Finally, some have argued that pres-
42. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 25, at 349. Rose-Ackerman also urges courts to "encourage 
deliberation" in Congress, thereby making a direct link between the law-and-economics and civic 
virtue approaches. 
43. Id. at 351. 
44. A visible institution such as the presidency is also supposed to help overcome the relative 
organizational disadvantages of diffuse groups by surmounting their informational and. transac-
tional disadvantage$ through visibility and ease of monitoring. See Fitts, Vices of Virtue, supra 
note 11, at 1606. 
45. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. 
46. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 
1782 (1975); Bruff, supra note 28, at 248 ("modern legal requirementS defining administrative 
rationality share with legislative formality the effect of ensuring that public policy will be sup-
ported by coalitions representing a set of values that is relatively widely accepted"). 
47. See, e.g., Kronman, The Privacy Exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, 9 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 727, 734 (1980). 
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idential oversight of administrative agencies, through such techniques 
as enhanced review of agency regulations, can provide the needed ex-
pansion of diffuse political oversight necessary to counteract the orga-
nizational advantages of special interest groups.48 
II. THE VALUE OF INFORMATION UNDER THE 
CIVIC VIRTUE MODEL 
Although civic virtue scholars come to these issues from a mark-
edly different perspective from the approach discussed above, many 
also appear to be exploring different mechanisms for stimulating the 
production and dissemination of information among political institu-
tions. 49 According to this viewpoint, a major purpose of government 
is to create a full and developed dialogue among political and social 
actors representing a rich diversity of social, economic, and ideological 
viewpoints. so 
A. An Overview 
At its core, the philosophical concern of civic virtue is the influ-
ence of self-interest in political decisionmaking. In this sense, it is di-
48. See Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking. 88 YALE L.J. 451 (1979); 
Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. EcoN. & 
ORG. 81 (1985); Pierce, The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 
TEXAS L. REV. 469, 520-24 (1985); Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of 
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 663-64 (1984). Although all of these 
proposals may in their specific requirements lead to different policy outcomes, their common 
underlying goal is to improve political oversight of administrative behavior by disseminating 
greater public information about government activities, thereby overcoming the collective action 
problems of information acquisition and counterbalancing the differential advantage of the spe· 
cial interest groups in influencing administrative behavior. 
49. See generally Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988) (sum-
marizing civic republican approach to political institutions). In the following discussion I will 
focus prinpipally on Sunstein's scholarship, both because he appears to have become a "leader" 
of this approach, and because he consciously and thoughtfully seeks to summarize and rational-
ize a broad spectrum of legal opinions and secondary literature focusing on the structure of 
political institutions. Where applicable, I will note differences between his approach and that of 
others writing in the tradition. Frank Michelman, for example, appears to focus more on the 
Supreme Court, rather than political institutions generally, as the center of the civic virtue dia-
logue. See Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self Government, 
JOO HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986) [hereinafter Michelman, Traces of Self-Government]. But cj 
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1531 (1988) (appearing to recognize a more 
institutionally pluralist conception of dialogue). 
50. See generally Sunstein, supra note 49; Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 421, 429, 510 (1987) (simultaneous presidential, legislative, and judicial control 
can, "by proliferating the points of access to government ... , increase the opportunity for 
groups to seek and obtain reform" and "bring about something close to the safeguards of the 
original constitutional framework"). Sunstein has also argued for a dispersal of power in admin-
istration because, as in the case of separate branches, usually "at least one branch will be respon-
sive to the interests of politically weak groups and thus will become an advocate for reform." Id. 
at 489-90. 
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rected toward one of the same goals that led Rawls to develop his 
heuristic device, "the original p,0sition"51 ..:___to make decisionmakers 
"think from the point of view of everybody."52 Because of the social 
biases created by individuals' knowledge of their own social positions 
and the effect of agreements on their individual welfare, Rawls origi-
nally proposed the veil as a mental filter that would serve to excise 
decisiomiiakers' knowledge of their own place in society and their own 
belief systems. 53 1 
The value of this device in stimulating a "true" dialogue has been 
questioned, however, on the grounds that the original position appears 
to excise important information about decisionmakers as real people. 
How, it has been asked, can a normatively attractive social consensus 
be achieved by disembodied individuals lacking knowledge of real peo-
ple and their human motivation - "good" or "bad"?54 In short, 
"[f]or republicans, the problem with the original position as a guide to 
political institutions or as a political ideal is that it is too solitary and 
insufficiently dialogic. "55 
In their design of political institutions, therefore, civic virtue schol-
ars seek to create a rational dialogue through the opposite technique: 
lead decisionmakers in the real world, obviously possessing full knowl-
edge of their own social positions and_ belief systems, to engage in the 
type of normative discussion that Rawls believed would occur behind 
the veil. In this case, however, the bias of political actors' social back-
grounds would be overcome by increasing the number of dialogic par-
51. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-12 (1971). 
52. Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1569 (quoting Okin, Reason and Feeling in Thinking about 
Justice, 99 ETHICS 229 (1989)). Of course, the veil can further other purposes as well. 
53. J. RAWLS, supra note 51, at 17-22. 
54. See generally L. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 59-66 (1987); M. 
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1984); Nagel, Rawls on Justice, in READ-
ING RAWLS 8-10 (N. Daniels ed. 1975). The veil of ignorance, it also has been argued, incor-
rectly portrays man as a narcissistic, nonvirtuous decisionmaker, who can engage in public 
responsibilities and decisionmaking only if he is unaware of its impact on his own interests. 
55. Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1571 (footnote omitted); cf. Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 
Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 60 n.240 (1987) (Rawls "as-
sumes a single and universal perspective from which all expectations can be discerned" and is 
"insufficiently sensitive to the possibility of competing perspectives"). 
This does not suggest that Rawls' overall theory is inconsistent with the civic virtue perspec-
tive. For one, the veil is a device ultimately intended to inform the situated reader - as a 
thought experiment. See, e.g., Baker, Sandel on Rawls, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 895, 898 (1985); 
Okin, Reason and Feeling in Thinking and Justice, 99 ETHICS 229, 246 (1989). In addition, 
Rawls does not suggest the veil of ignorance should be recreated in existing political institutions, 
only used as a heuristic device for thinking about a just structure for society. See J. RAWLS, 
supra note 51, at 195 (discussing application of principles of justice to structure of political insti-
tutions). For this reason, it can reasonably be argued that civic virtue is a consistent extension of 
the Rawlsian 11pproach to the structure of political institutions. See Sunstein, supra note 49, at 
1567 n.160, 1571 n.183. 
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ticipants and expanding the information base. Political actors would 
thus "generate institutions that will produce deliberation among 
the differently situated, . not mimic decisions . . . made by the 
unsituated. " 56 
The difference in technique between the Rawlsian veil of ignorance 
and rational dialogue under the civic virtue model should be under-
scored. 57 The structure of the veil of ignorance presumes that deci-
sionmaking may be improved and dialogue promoted by excising 
information - that is, by disembodying individuals from knowledge 
of their society and values. The approach of civic virtue theory, how-
ever, views dialogue from a different perspective: the presumption is 
that a rational dialogue cannot take place absent knowledge of one's 
values and society. To ensure that real-world decisionmaking will not 
be biased, or at least that the bias will be reduced, civic virtue relies on 
a social dialogue encompassing a wide variety of individuals from dif-
ferent perspectives and walks of life. The resulting exchange and ex-
pansion of information, it is supposed, will lead participants to 
broaden their perspectives and "think from the point of view of every-
one" - largely what the veil is intended to achieve.58 Quite simply, 
under the civic virtue view, "the purpose of politics is ... the transfor-
mation of private interests into public interests through discussion and 
persuasion. "59 
B. Legal Application 
To achieve these goals, the civic virtue literature generally explores 
a variety of new or expanded doctrines and institutions that would 
ensure diverse informational inputs. As a general matter, these doc-
56. Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1571; see also id. at 1575, 1586 (footnotes omitted): 
Impartiality within republican theories . . . require public-regarding justifications offered 
after multiple points of view have been consulted and (to the extent possible) genuinely 
understood. 
[T]he basic constitutional institutions of federalism, bicameralism, and checks and bal-
ances share some of the appeal of proportional representation, ..• proliferat[ing] the points 
of access to government, increasing the ability of diverse groups to influence policy, multi-
plying perspectives in government, and improving deliberative capacities. 
Sunstein also remarks that "politics should ... allow for a measure of critical distance from and 
scrutiny of [citizen] desires, bringing new information and different perspectives to bear." Id. at 
1544; see also Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, supra note 49, at 76 ("The norm of justice 
to parties itself commands that no other norm should ever take a form that preempts questions or 
exempts from reason-giving."). 
57. Indeed, as will be seen, the difference has practical significance because real-world at-
tempts to further dialogue on one dimension may be in tension with techniques used to further it 
along another. See infra notes 212-17 and accompanying text. 
58. See Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1569 (quoting Okin, supra note 55, at 229). 
59. Mashaw, supra note 25, at 130. 
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trines and institutions would serve to proliferate the points of access to 
government and disperse power, thereby increasing the opportunity 
for different groups to find institutional representation within the fed- . 
eral government and to participate in public dialogue. Recent propos-
als for supplementing checks and balances; facilitating independent 
and "insulated" political representation; promoting "consistency" and 
"high visibility" in statutory construction; requiring proportional rep-
resentation; and ensuring presidential, judicial, and legislative partici-
pation in and oversight of administrative decisionmaking are all 
intended to expand and diversify expressed opinions. 60 
These proposals are outgrowths of earlier doctrinal developments 
in administrative, first amendment, and race discrimination law. In 
administrative law, the so-called "hard-look" doctrine and earlier at-
tempts to expand procedures and supplement intervention by a wide 
variety of groups were originally advanced on the ground that they 
would force agency officials to engage in a dialogue with the courts 
and other social actors. 61 This exchange, overseen by the courts, was 
intended to force agency officials to come to understand the limitations 
of their own position as well as to reveal any blatantly improper or 
illicit motives. 62 Similarly, first amendment and race discrimination 
law has on oc~asion sought to force public decisionmakers to reveal 
and explain their reasons for acting to extend a benefit, thereby help-
60. See Fitts, Vices of Virtue, supra note 11, at 1586-92 (summarizing authors). See generally 
Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, supra note 49, at 33 ("The dialogic themes express the 
vision of social normative choice as participatory, exploratory, and persuasive, rather than spe-
cialized, deductive or demonstrative."); Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1557 ("Republicans envision 
[the-government] process as a forum in which alternative perspectives and additional information 
are brought to bear ... increasing available opportunities [for input] and information."). Of 
course, this approach is not necessarily true of all writers who might be viewed as writing in the 
civic virtue tradition. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE 
(1980) (developing a more objectively limited and nonculturally dependent conception of dia-
logue); Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, supra note 49 (appearing to develop a more 
court-centered approach to dialogue). 
61. Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L. 
REV. 1805, 1811-13 (1978); Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. 
L. REV. 1193, 1267-71, 1278-82 (1982); Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 
1983 SUP. Cr. REV. 177, 182-83; see also Greater Boston Television Co. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 
850-53 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). But see Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). See generally Tribe, 
Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 301 (1975) (Structural due process 
"envision[s] the Supreme Court as structuring a dialogue between the state and those whose 
liberty its laws confine, a dialogue in which the continuing legitimacy of a law turns on the 
current willingness and ability of the state to come forth with rational justifications for the law's 
continued enforcement."). 
62. See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 471 (concluding that the hard-look doctrine is "an effort 
to 'flush out' illegitimate or unarticulated factors ... to ensure that those factors are available for 
discussion and comment during and after the rulemaking process"); id. at 478 ("A firm judicial 
hand has disciplined administrative outcomes by correcting parochial or ill-reasoned decisions 
and serving as a significant deterrent."). 
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ing to reveal whether or not the true motive for the government action 
was a permissible one. 63 In general, the legal admonition that political 
actors "listen" and "respond" to the arguments of others is the norma-
tive linchpin of the civic virtue perspective. By seeking to understand 
and to converse with all relevant actors, decisionmakers should better 
understand the limitations of their own viewpoint, both factually and 
normatively.64 While recognizing the clear "participation" benefits to 
diverse informational inputs, 65 this approach focuses on the quality of 
political decisions made in a framework of public dialogue. 
Thus, while the standard law-and-economics and civic virtue anal-
yses of the public interest are often treated as antagonistic, they have a 
common perspective on the issue of information. Both generally favor 
increased levels of information - either through the government's 
production of information and the assignment of property rights (the 
law-and-economics view), or tJ:ie proliferation of the points of access 
to government (the civic virtue view). The law-and-economics ap-
proach emphasizes the utilitarian value of information - its ability to 
reveal productive or exchange opportunities for furthering means/end 
rationality. Civic virtue, on the other hand, views the elucidation of 
opinions primarily as serving a value-based function, leading people 
(by the exchange of information and ideologies) to recognize the bias 
of their own positions, and to change their preferences or values -
that is, to help identify ends. Taken together, however, these two tra-
ditions show that information can be of benefit normatively as well as 
instrumentally. 66 
63. See, e.g .. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 532, 548-54 (1980) (Stevens, J,, dissent· 
ing); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103, 114-17 (1976); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 
558 (1948); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); see also Monaghan, First Amendment 
"Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1970). But see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 
(1972) (procedural due process does not require hearing of first amendment claim by fired state 
employee absent entitlement). Similarly, the protection of "public discourse" under the first 
amendment is quite compatible with the civic virtue approach. See, e.g .. Post, The Constitutional 
Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Maga· 
zine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1990). 
64. See generally Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 
HARV. L. REV. l, 4 (1979); Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Pro-
cess, in NOMOS XVIII: DUE PROCESS 126, 127 (1977); Tribe, supra note 61; Tribe, The Emerg-
ing Reconnection of Individual Rights and Institutional Design: Federalism, Bureaucracy and 
Due Process of Lawmaking, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 433, 444 (1977); Weisberg, The Calabresian 
Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1983) (discussing the 
"new legal process" view of dialogue); Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J. PHIL. S (1989). 
65. See, e.g., Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 
B.U. L. REV. 885 (1981). 
66. Of course, there are potential differences. For example, proliferating points of access can 
in some cases diminish the amount of information, or at least merely change the type of informa-
tion, rather than increase its overall level. 
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III. LIMITED INFORMATION AS A POSITIVE INFLUENCE IN 
DECISIONMAKING: THE UTILITARIAN VALUE OF PARTY 
IDENTIFICATION AND RELATED INSTITUTIONS 
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Despite these important arguments in favor of more information, 
less information can be advantageous along several dimensions, even 
when viewed in light of the goals articulated by the civic virtue and 
law-and-economics traditions. A variety of legal and political institu-
tions that serve to create less information are useful in pursuing some 
of the long-term goals of one or both traditions. This Part focuses on 
the utilitarian benefits of party identification and limited information 
as devices for improving reasoning processes (section III.A), overcom-
ing perverse interest group incentives (section III.B), and avoiding 
political stalemate (section III.C). These are models one, two, and 
three, as sketched earlier in this article. 67 I also consider the signifi-
cance of these effects to several possible governmental reforms (section 
IIl.D), and the problems they can present to the civic virtue and law-
and-economics perspectives (section III.E). 
A. Limited Information as a Value in Promoting Rational 
Decisionmaking (Model I) 
At first glance, it is difficult to understand how less information 
can improve reasoning processes. As noted above, under a traditional 
economic or utilitarian model of decisionmaking, each new piece of 
information should be integrated according to its probative impact on 
events and marginal judgments; the information should enhance 
rather than undermine utilitarian decisionmaking. Since, under this 
analysis, "the costs of information acquisition and transmission and 
the costs of search are the only factors that limit the quest for more 
information,"68 expansion of information should be presumptively ad-
vantageous. Similarly, under a value-based view of rational dialogue, 
the greater the number of perspectives, the less likely should be the 
bias or irrationality of the ultimate judgment. 69 Thus, generally speak-
ing, more information should improve ethical decisionmaking as well. 
Diverse literatures from social psychology, philosophy and organi-
zation theory, however, indicate that this process can be more compli-
cated than this general description suggests. In situations of high 
67. See supra text accompanying notes 12-16. 
68. L. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 12 (emphasis added). 
69. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. Of course, there are some limits on public 
discourse, at least according to some civic republicans. See Michelman, Laws Republic, supra 
note 49, at 1527 (public discourse should not be "considered or experienced as coercive, or inva-
sive, or otherwise a violation of one's identity or freedom"). 
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complexity or uncertainty, 70 decisionmakers are often aided by "heu-
ristic" devices, which affect the use of information in two different and 
subtle ways.71 First, a heuristic boils down a complex of information 
into a shorthand analytic framework.72 Economists would view this 
process as decreasing the marginal costs of transmitting the informa-
tion, though the number of actual verbal communications (that is, the 
amount of dialogue, in a colloquial sense) would ordinarily be reduced 
as well.73 Second, and more importantly, in order to facilitate analysis 
of the information actually transmitted, the heuristic also serves to ex-
clude some information. This limitation, in fact, is a precondition to 
effective comprehensive analysis. As Christopher Schroeder has ob-
served, "comprehensive rationality ... reduces choice to an analysis of 
the efficacy of available alternatives to achieve predetermined goals ... 
inevitably entail[ing] simplification, both in the specification of goals 
and in the modeling methods employed to predict the extent to which 
alternatives achieve them."74 In the absence of such limitations, deci-
70. The problems of rational decisionmaking in such situations have been extensively investi-
gated. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (D. 
Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds. 1982); Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice and the 
Framing of Decisions, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSY· 
CHOLOGY 67 (R. Hogarth & M. Reder eds. 1987). As Daniel Farber observes, decisionmakers 
"systematically deviate from rationality in considering combinations of risks; they ignore back-
ground information in assessing new data; and they are easily swayed by trivial changes in the 
presentation of information." Farber, Environmentalism, Economics, and The Public Interest, 41 
STAN. L. REV. 1021, 1035 (1989). 
71. For a discussion of the value of limited information in organization theory, see D. 
BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION 53 (1963); ]. MARCH & H. SIMON, 
ORGANIZATIONS 203-04 (1958); H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 80-83 (1976); H. SI· 
MON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1982); A. WILDAVSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO 
POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY ANALYSIS 36 (1979). 
72. Sociologists might call this an ideal-type. See supra note 20. 
73. This process is the basis of decreased "costs" in an economic sense. In an information-
ally perfect world, the heuristic would serve as a "sufficient statistic." See B. LINDGEN, STATIS· 
TICAL THEORY 191-205 (1962). 
74. Schroeder, Rights Against Risk, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 495, 502 n.29 (1986). In other 
words, the process of comprehensive rational decisionmaking itself, as the philosophers of the 
social science and organization theory point out, requires a dwarfing of marginal variables to 
facilitate analysis. For a law-and-economics explanation of this process, see A.M. POLINSKY, 
supra note 21, at 4 ("The art of economics is picking assumptions that simplify a problem enough 
to better understand certain features of it, without inevitably causing those features to be unim-
portant ones."); R. POSNER, supra note 21, at 16 ("[A]bstraction - reductionism, if you like -
is the essence of scientific inquiry. A scientific theory must select from the welter of experience 
that it is trying to explain .... ")(footnote omitted). For an organization-theory explanation, see 
D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 71, at 117 {"The synoptic approach makes such 
comprehensive demands for information and analysis that theories are desperately needed merely 
to discipline the gathering of information and to organize the multiple implications of whatever 
evidence is gathered."); A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 71, at 36 ("[A]nalysis welcomes constraints. 
If everything is seen as possible, nothing can be done."); J. MARCH & H. SIMON, supra note 71, 
at 139 ("Choice is always exercised with respect to a limited, approximate, simplified 'model' of 
the real situation"). A somewhat similar tradeolf is presented in the choice between rulemaking 
and adjudication in administrative law. Cf Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administratfre 
Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 430 (1981). 
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sionmakers often cannot engage in effective analysis, tending (in a type 
of information overload) to miss "the forest for the trees" and to use 
the greater information in a stochastic manner. 75 
1. The Value of Party Identification and Related Party Structures 
Although the significance of heuristics and information overload in 
a variety of contexts is a subject of legitimate controversy, 76 two of the 
most important tools of national political organization - strong par-
ties and party identification - appear to serve this function both in 
theory and in practice. As I have argued previously, political parties 
are rightfully praised for their ability to disseminate their message 
broadly to the public. 77 At the same time, however, their power and 
influence is also achieved_ - especially at the national level - by chan-
neling and implicitly red~cing the number of public communications 
about political actors, programs, and policies. The reason this occurs 
is that political parties seek to focus the public's attention on a visible 
cue - party identification - which is intended both to simplify a vast 
amount of information about individual candidates, and, in order that 
it will be understood and followed, to overshadow and dwarf the static 
of individual political communications. 78 "[P]olitical parties 
75. See, e.g., D. BRAYBROOKE & c. LINDBLOM, supra 71, at 51, 113, 117; A. WILDAVSKY, 
supra note 71, at 32, 36; D. KATZ & R. KAHN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS 
507 (2d ed. 1978); J. STEINBRUNER, CYBERNETIC THEORY OF DECISION 12 (1974). Indeed, 
investigations in the natural sciences may involve something like the same process. See T. 
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE Of SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). 
76. Compare Grether, Schwartz & Wilde, The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Anal-
ysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1986) (criticizing use of information 
overload analysis in legal context) with Edwards & von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their 
Implications for the Law, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 225 (1986) (suggesting application ot psychological 
literature to the law). 
77. See Fitts, Vices of Virtue, supra note 11, at 1606. What follows is not intended to deny 
the importance of this fundamental advantage. Rather, I outline here the related positive benefits 
of the channeling (and implicit limiting) of information undertaken by some political parties. 
78. See D. PRICE, BRINGING BACK THE PARTIES 110 (1984); Popkin, Gorman, Phillips & 
Smith, What Have You Done For Me Lately? Toward An Investment Theory of Voting, 70 AM. 
POL. Sci. REV. 779, 780 (1976); see also infra note 138. 
Of course, it can be argued that parties should not be dependent on limited information once 
the party label has been established in the public consciousness. Under this reasoning, while 
party identification does depend on a heuristic label that inherently simplifies and limits informa-
tion and communications, once that label is publicized and understood, the public should then 
simply evaluate the complex world of diverse communications in light of the label, through a 
type of reflective equilibrium. As a factual matter, however, this bifurcated process is difficult to 
achieve: the proliferation of informational inputs appears to overwhelm the label in a type of 
information overload. Moreover, given the limited amount of time the public has to spend listen-
ing to political communications, more time spent on individual communications necessarily 
means less time spent on information about the party, and a reduced significance of the party 
label. See M. WATTENBERG, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES (1984); Rich-
ardson, Constituency Candidates Versus Parties in Japanese Voting Behavior, 82 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 695, 700 (1988). While the public may be more capable of undertaking this effort now than 
in the past, see Fitts, Vices of Virtue, supra note 11, at 1640 (summarizing authors), there is 
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originated in large part from the need of voters for a guide, a set of 
symbolic shortcuts, to the confusing and often trackless political ter-
rain. "79 The simplification of the general wealth of political informa-
tion in a party label can facilitate the ability of a diffuse public -
which often cares very little individually about those political events, 
though very much in the aggregate - to follow political affairs. 80 In 
short, because people are uninformed on most issues, "democracy 
[may be] best served by reducing and simplifying those choices to a 
single electoral choice."8 I 
Based on this benefit, the traditional party identificatiop, which 
was generally criticized during the 1950s and 1960s,82 has now gar-
nered some academic respectability and praise, as have political parties 
as organizations structurally impelled to create this symbol. 83 Faced 
with the necessity of forging a program and platform attractive to a 
majority of the population and capable of rationalizing the running of 
government, party forces must draw connections between issues, pro-
grams, and interests that may not be apparent in the din of diverse, 
decentralized individual political conversation, but would nevertheless 
be attractive to a winning coalition. By drawing these linkages, party 
forces serve to highlight the interrelationship between issues - that is, 
to create a heuristic device. Moreover, while the political party organ-
ization itself obviously creates some new information - the party la-
bel - it succeeds in getting the public to understand and use that label 
partly by simplifying (and, in so doing, necessarily limiting) the wealth 
of political information about candidates and government. In effect, 
party identification is maintained by the fact that the party exercises 
greater control than individual politicians over political resources and 
communications. The result is that political events are more accessi-
continuing indication that it has difficulty keeping abreast of political events and is advantaged 
by the party label, see E. SMITH, THE UNCHANGING AMERICAN VOTER (1989). 
79. F. SAUROF & P. BECK, PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 503 (6th ed. 1988). Indeed, party 
identification has been aptly described as the "party in the electorate." Id. at 160. 
80. In contrast to more concentrated special interest groups, the diffuse public simply cannot 
take the time, and in some cases does not have the ability regardless of time, to engage in rational 
political dialogue or to understand marginal utilities or benefits of alternative policies. Given the 
collective action problem of political mobilization, it is not rational for the public to expend 
much effort. The party label is an important shorthand device enabling diffuse publics to deal 
with public issues in a modem industrial society. 
81. J. WILSON, THE AMATEUR DEMOCRAT 343 (1962); see also M. McGERR, THE DE· 
CLINE OF POPULAR POLITICS 206 (1986) (noting that decline of partisanship "presented a com-
plex, less accessible political world"}. 
82. See, ~g., A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER & D. STOKES, THE AMERICAN 
VOTER (1960). 
83. See, e.g., Popkin, Gorman, Phillips & Smith, supra note 78. 
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ble and more important to the public. 84 
Some critics correctly question the ability of the public to agree on 
the party linkages at various times, rightly observing that the question 
is one of balance between simplification and specification.85 Certainly, 
American history includes examples of groups, especially blacks, that 
were excluded from political debate and power partly by the duopoly 
of a two-party system. Despite this, however, the simplification of 
party labels has also served at times to promote public understanding 
of political events, especially among less educated and poorer 
groups. 86 To the extent that the voting public focuses on this informa-
tion, and is less likely to dwell on the often confusing static of diverse 
individual political conversations, the instrumental rationality of its 
decisions can be improved. s1 
84. See M. McGERR, supra note 81, at 134 ("Traditional party journalism ... eased readers' 
participation in politics by creating an accessible political world[;] [p ]arty papers made politics 
seem important, simplified issues, [and] encouraged the public to judge men and measures with 
the yardstick of partisanship .... "); R. ENTMAN, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT CITIZENS 137 (1989) 
("The decline of participation in the U.S. has historically paralleled the dwindling of the partisan 
press and the rise of objectivity."). 
85. Sees. SAUROF & P. BECK, supra note 79, at 58 (1988); A. WARE, CITIZENS, PARTIES 
AND THE STATE 238 (1987); Miller, supra note 31. Indeed, Morris Fiorina, who has written 
extensively about the importance of strengthening party organization, has recently noted that 
some of the breakdown of party influence may simply be a result in part of popular preference for 
divided government. See Fiorina, An Era of Divided Government, in DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERI-
CAN POLITICS (B. Caine & G. Peele eds.) (forthcoming 1990). 
86. The binary choice offered in two-party rule may also be one means for overcoming the 
social costs of political Condorcet cycling, the endless voting cycle created when voting is multi-
peaked. See H. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 111-15 (1984); P. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND 
POLITICAL THEORY 56-59 (1988). This is not only because political parties exercise agenda 
control, thereby eliminating such cycling, but also because a socialization process may occur that 
will make positions among political actors more "single peaked," and thus not subject to cycling. 
As Albert Weale has observed, "The effect of a two-party system is to force voters to think of 
issues in the same way, namely in terms ofa choice between party A and party B." Weale, Social 
Choice Versus Populism? An Interpretation of Riker's Political Theory, 14 BR. J. PoL. SCI. 369, 
373 (1984); cf. Mashaw, supra note 48, at 99 (noting that dialogue can produce single peaked 
distribution in some contexts). From the perspective of some legal academicians exploring liter-
ary theory, political parties might also be a means of helping to forge a rough type of interpreta-
tive community, which can be viewed as a prerequisite to meaningful group dialogue or 
understanding. See Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 745 (1982) (ob-
serving that interpretation can be objective within a given legal interpretative community). Of 
course, there is a fundamental question whether an interpretative community in the literary or 
philosophical sense can or should be established in the political or legal system. See Kahn, Com-
munity in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J. 1 (1989); Mann, The Universe and 
the Library: A Critique of James Boyd White as Writer and Reader, 41 STAN. L. REV. 959 
(1989). See also Post, supra note 63 (discussing some of the tension between community and 
civic dialogue in the first amendment context). 
87. Indeed, this benefit might be understood in terms quite compatible with some aspects of 
economic and civic virtue theory - namely, the value of a principal/agency relationship between 
the public and government officials. For the economics theory, see Alchian & Demsetz, Produc-
tion, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. EcoN. REV. 777 (1972); Jensen & 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. 
FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976). For the civic virtue theory, see Sunstein, Interest Groups in American 
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 69-72 (1985); Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public 
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2. Party Identification and Public Dialogue 
The simplification of political dialogue inherent in party identifica-
tion has historically provided another instrumental benefit: improved 
"communication" between government and the public, and, in this 
sense, enhanced government accountability to public judgments, espe-
cially those of the poor. 88 In a dispersed environment of diverse polit-
ical dialogue, the meaning of electoral events is more often unclear, as 
hundreds of individual candidate peculiarities determine particular 
electoral decisions with respect to congressional seats and state offices. 
This is especially true because voting is disproportionately retrospec-
tive, with voters responding best to clear government actions,· 89 in a 
government of dispersed powers, government actions are less likely to 
be the subject of popular affirmation or retribution, since no individual 
government official or party controls government sufficiently to be 
held responsible and subject to clear retrospective evaluation. 90 Polit-
ical parties, to the extent they control government, can serve as a 
structure that frames issues and programs in clear and simple terms 
for the whole public.91 While there may be a reduction in rational 
dialogue in a legal or philosophical sense, which cannot be ignored, 
there can be a quite different benefit in systemic political accountabil-
ity - in a sense, mass public communication and dialogue through the 
Choice, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 873, 912 n.224 (1987). In the eyes of many political scientists, strong 
party identification effectively limits popular oversight of day-to-day government activities, re-
ducing political evaluations to general retrospective assessments about whether the party is act-
ing consistently with the voters' general views and interests. See M. FlORlNA, RETROSPECTIVE 
VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS (1981); V.0. KEY, THE RESPONSIBLE ELECTO· 
RATE (1964). In this sense, it establishes a principal/agency relationship between the people and 
their government, necessarily giving' the agent (that is, government leaders) some leeway. To the 
extent that the public is better at evaluating the general results of government actions, than at 
guiding specific future strategies, the generality of party identification may offer an advantage in 
promoting long-term rationality in voting. 
88. See Fitts, Vices of Virtue, supra note 11, at 1639-43. 
89. See V.O. KEY, supra note 84, at 63 ("[T]he major streams of shifting voters graphically 
reflect the electorate in its great, and perhaps principal role as an appraiser of past events, past 
performance, and past actions. It judges retrospectively; it commands prospectively only insofar 
as it expresses either approval or disapproval of that which has happened before."); M. FlORINA, 
supra note 87, at 5-6; cf. J. CLUBB, w. FLANIGAN & N. ZINGALE, PARTISAN REALIGNMENT: 
VOTERS, PARTIES AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 30-32, 267 (1980) (arguing that 
the major realignments in American political history depend on rejection and affirmation by the 
electorate of the parties' actions in power). 
90. As V.O. Key wrote, "[t]he vocabulary of the voice of the people consists mainly of the 
words 'yes' and 'no.'" v.o. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS 544 (5th ed. 
1964). 
91. Of course, dialogue between courts and Congress has been a frequent subject of academic 
analysis. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 26 (1962); Bickel & Wellington, 
Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14-35 
(1957); L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES (1988). The literature on party organization 
suggests that, at least in a systemic sense, this conversation may be undermined for the public by 
the decline of parties. 
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electoral system. 92 
To be sure, no one suggests that party identification is a perfect 
heuristic.93 As a practical matter, no such device can exist.94 By defi-
92. Indeed, along these same lines, there is some possibility that this simplification may have 
a significant effect on the ability of the political system to enter into high politics, that is, to 
precipitate what political scientists call a critical election, one of those rare constitutional move-
ments which is the basis for Bruce Ackerman's proposed system of judidal review. See Acker-
man, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1049-51, 1053-54 
(1984) (claiming that the role of the courts is to perfect the political understanding reached 
during prior periods of "high politics"); see also Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional 
Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989). Several scholars believe that a prerequisite to high politics is 
political control and accountability of government in one party's hands, such that the party's 
actions can become the subject of a comprehensive public retrospective evaluation. With the 
breakdown of the parties, there is some doubt whether in the future our political system will be 
able to precipitate as easily such high political debate, at least in a critical election sense. See D. 
BRADY, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND CONGRESSIONAL POLICY-MAKING 165-66, 179 (1988); W. 
BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 191 (1970); 
J. CLUBB, W. FLANIGAN & N. ZINGALE, supra note 89, at 161-62 (1980) ("[U]nified and sus-
tained partisan control of government was a necessary and obvious condition for the policy inno-
vations we usually see as the products of partisan realignments."); R. RUBIN, PRESS, PARTY, 
AND THE PRESIDENCY 216-17 (1981). If true, this structural change may also suggest that 
events like the failed Supreme Court nomination of Judge Robert Bork are a result of the tradi-
tional testing of the high political ·moment, as Ackerman argues, see Ackerman, Transformative 
Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164 (1988), but are also influenced by the breakdown of 
political parties, which makes it structurally more difficult for the "moment" to engulf all 
branches today. 
93. Scholars have explored other types of heuristics, although they have been considered far 
more controversial. During the 1950s, a variety of political scientists, reacting in part to the rise 
of Nazi Germany and to McCarthyism, criticized the ideological bent of American politics, fear-
ing that an ideological debate among the "masses" would promote McCarthyism and perhaps 
lead to fascism. See M. ROGIN, THE INTELLECTUALS AND McCARTHY: THE RADICAL SPEC-
TER 16-18 (1967) (summarizing authors). While this literature clearly overstated its position, it 
implicitly argued that the mass public needed a heuristic device by which it could rationally 
judge political life. Free-wheeling discussion and dissemination of information, especially in an 
abstract framework, supposedly obscured popular understanding of political events. 
The solution traditionally offered to these difficulties was pluralism. A self-interested and 
narrowly focussed debate, according to this thinking, would serve as an important heuristic to 
channel political thinking. By keeping debate narrowly self-interested, it could facilitate the abil-
ity of the public, especially the poor and less educated, to participate effectively in politics. See 
c. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 229-32 (1965); M. RoGIN, supra. This 
conclusion claimed some support from the literature favoring incremental decisionmaking in a 
wide variety of public policy contexts as a means of improving rationality. See, e.g., D. 
BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 71, at 243; Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling 
Through," 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79, 86 (1959); see also Diver, supra note 74 (advocating the use 
of incremental decisionmaking in all uncontroversial cases not threatening disastrous missteps or 
disenfranchisement); Miller, supra note 31, at 736 ("[O]rganizations in a pluralist society have an 
incentive to confine their actions to the businesslike pursuit of their narrow defining interests and 
not to pursue broad ideological goals."). While the cost of this increase in control over immedi-
ate events was an abandonment of political debate over more long-term, philosophical issues, this 
vice was supposed to have a potential virtue in political understanding and control. 
Unfortunately, pluralism ignored or at least undervalued pervasive transaction costs, wealth 
effects, and the philosophical and normative vacuity of self-interested thinking. See supra text 
accompanying notes 26-31 and note 31. For this reason, while the normative defense of political 
parties has sometimes accepted the value of self-interest as a rationalizing device, see Fitts, Vices 
of Virtue, supra note 11, at 1641, many political scientists have advocated overcoming these other 
criticisms of pluralism through a different heuristic device - party identification. This system 
supposedly allows the public to have a manageable understanding of the comprehensive public 
issues that some pluralists thought would overwhelm it. 
946 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:917 
nition, a heuristic simplifies and abstracts from reality, based on the 
decisionmaker's judgment as to what is important, as well as her need 
to facilitate analysis of social problems.95 As civic-virtue and other 
writers have pointed out repeatedly and correctly, existing social insti-
tutions and heuristic devices necessarily bias public judgments. 96 In-
deed, the argument on behalf of a two-party system (as opposed to a 
one-party system) is based on the need for alternatives to and criticism 
of a particular party perspective.97 Ultimately, the question is one of 
balance. The political party approach cautions, however, that a con-
stant increase in_ the diversity of politiCal inputs, which check each 
perspective with other perspectives,98 will not eliminate the use of 
heuristic devices; they are inherent in human processing of informa-
tion.99 In the absence of strong parties and party labels, members of 
the public may well generate their own types of anchoring devices 
which can be worse. 
94. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
95. This is perhaps one reason that some common law legal analysts and interdisciplinary 
legal scholars criticize each other's analytic methodology as simplistic. On one level, they are 
both correct, since all models simplify reality to facilitate understanding. See M. WEBER, METH· 
ODOLOGY, supra note 20, at 20; cf B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CoNSTITU· 
TION 10-15 (1977) (distinguishing between "scientific policymakers" and "ordinary observers" as 
alternative paradigms of legitimate legal analysis); R. POSNER, supra note 21, at 16 
("[A]bstraction - reductionism, if you like - is of the essence of scientific inquiry. A scientific 
theory must select from the welter of experience that it is trying to explain, and it is therefore 
necessarily unrealistic when compared directly to actual conditions.") (footnote omitted), 
96. We all have come to understand the pervasive influence of anchoring phenomena and 
social background in conceptual thinking. See C. BAKER, supra note 10, at 14-22; J. ELSTER, 
SOUR GRAPES (1983); Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law. 5 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 1 (1975); Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 
(1986) (arguing that legal intervention despite private preferences may be justified when those 
preferences depend on the legal and social orders). See generally K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY 
AND UTOPIA (1954); Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of 
Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617 (1973). 
97. See A. DOWNS, AN EcONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 140-41 (1957); E. 
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 11, at 60. 
98. See Sunstein, supra note 96, at 1154 ("A political process that subjects private choices to 
critical scrutiny will in this sense produce better laws than a process that takes them as exoge-
nous."); Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, supra note 49, at 76 ("The norm of justice to 
parties itself commands that no other norm should ever take a form that preempts questions or 
exempts from reason-giving."); cf Minow, supra note 55, at 74 ("Justice depends on the possibil-
ity of conflicts among the values and perspectives that justice pursues."). 
99. See sources cited supra note 71. As Cass Sunstein recognizes: "If the ideas of endoge-
nous preferences and cognitive distortions are carried sufficiently far, it may be impossible to 
describe a truly autonomous preference ...• It is difficult indeed to generate a baseline from 
which to describe genuine autonomy and an approach that tries to abstract entirely from social 
pressures is unlikely to be fruitful." Sunstein, supra note 96, at 1170-71. Ultimately, political 
understanding can benefit from organizing principles, ideal types, which facilitate understanding 
of political action. Competing political parties perform this role for a modem industrial society, 
See supra note 86 (discussing the possible need for an interpretative community to engage in 
group dialogue). 
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B. Limited Information as a Benefit in Promoting Utilitarian 
Efficiency (Model II) 
947 
The political party literature thus indicates that less information 
and party identification can serve as a heuristic device to simplify and 
organize political information. This approach also suggests a second 
possible utilitarian benefit to more limited information: niinimizing 
groups' narrow pursuit of self-interest that, from a societal perspec-
tive, would have led to a reduction in social welfare through the pro-
cess of universalism described above. Put another way, less 
information may help forge a sense of collective responsibility, without 
which the pursuit of self-interest may make many citizens worse off.100 
This is the classic prisoners' dilemma, which was described earlier as 
Model II. 101 
1. The Influence of Special Interest Groups 
As discussed above, a major reason often offered for the heightened 
and potentially perverse influence of narrow constituencies in congies-
sional and administrative decisionmaking is the splintering of govern-
mental power among different government actors. The increasing 
independence of representatives within Congress is thought in many 
cases to advantage narrow interest groups that can secure a legislative 
foothold and trade that position for influence within the legislative 
process. This independence is secured, to a large degree, by represent-
atives delivering discrete services to their districts in the form of con-
stituent services, pork-barrel legislation, or other concentrated 
benefits. The cost of these services, however, is other constituent serv-
ices and pork-barrel legislation obtained by other representatives -
so-called universalism - resulting in reduced social welfare. Once a 
regime of universalism has been established, moreover, there is no ba-
sis for individual legislators or their constituents to opt out of the sys-
tem.102 As in the prisoners' dilemma, many groups would be better 
off, under this analysis, if representatives could reach a binding agree-
ment to end the system.103 
100. Limited information is beneficial for the individual in this context, it should be noted, 
only if similarly situated political actors are also restrained by the information limitation, so as to 
avoid the prisoners' dilemma. As in the case of the prisoner's dilemma there would be an individ-
ual instrumental advantage to this type of information. See supra note 15. 
101. See supra notes 14-15 and llCCOmpanying text. 
102. If the constituents should elect a civically virtuous representative, she alone would not 
be able to change the nature of the regime or political bargains, but could only deprive her 
constituents of their piece of the pie. 
103. For a general description of this process, see L. DODD & R. SCHOTI, CONGRESS AND 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1979); M. FIORINA, supra note 30; Shepsle & Weingast, Legisla-
tive Politics and Budget Outcomes, in FEDERAL BUDGET POLICY IN THE 1980's 343 (1984). 
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2. Party Identification 
There is good reason to believe, however, that strong party identifi-
cation (as well as strong party control over political resources that 
help maintain that identification) may tend to reduce this problem, 
especially at the national level. Strong parties, which control political 
resources and create strong party identification, thereby diminish the 
ability of legislative representatives to communicate effectively infor-
mation to their constituents regarding any delivery by the representa-
tives of special services peculiar to their particular districts. 104 In a 
sense, strong party identification, which is created and reinforced by 
strong party influences over communications, creates a verbal or psy~ 
chological centralization of authority by leading constituents not to 
focus on any special services - individual or legislative - that might 
be performed by their representatives, but rather to vote and debate on 
the success or failure of the party as a whole. In this environment, 
representatives obviously have less of an ability or incentive to spend 
their time distinguishing themselves from the party or leaders and per-
forming discrete legislative, constituent, or symbolic activities, 105 and 
more reason to work with party leaders in favor of a general party 
program for which they would be held accountable. 106 Although dia-
logue and information ordinarily are viewed as forging a sense of com-
munity, here the opposite can be true: the absence of information 
From the opposite perspective, a more centralized government structure often appears to avoid 
some of these problems. See Inman, Markets, Governments, and the "New" Political Economy, in 
2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC EcoNOMICS 647, 692-739 (A. Auerbach & M. Feldstein eds. 1987) 
(reviewing public choice literature on centralized rule); Inman, Federal Assistance and Local 
Services in the United States: The Evolution of a New Federal Fiscal Order, in FISCAL FEDERAL· 
ISM AND QUANTITATIVE STUDIES (H. Rosen ed. 1988) (discussing the benefits of a majority rule 
system, as opposed to a dispersed system, in federal grant programs); J. COGAN, THE EVOLU· 
TION OF CoNGRESSIONAL BUDGET DECISIONMAKING AND THE EMERGENCE OF FEDERAL 
DEFICITS (The Hoover Institution Working Paper No. E-88-33, 1988) (concluding that legisla-
tive decentralization has led to deficits). 
104. To be sure, the traditional picture of the party machine is of an organization facilitating 
graft. As the text suggests, however, party identification can obviate the need for the party to 
undertake such distributions in order to maintain its strength. 
105. As has been observed: "So long as individual candidates have some freedom to tailor 
their positions to their particular districts, they will naturally be perceived more favorably than 
an institution, such as Congress, or ... the chief executive, that in effect is constrained to adopt a 
single national position." B. CAINE, J. FEREJOHN & M. FIORINA, THE PERSONAL VOTE 200 
(1987). 
106. See sources cited infra note 138. The textual argument, it should be noted, is the polit-
ical counterpart of a negative-information thesis first put forward by economist Richard Hirsh-
leifer in the case of certain types of insurance contracts. See Hirshleifer, supra note 25. As 
Hirshleifer observed, market participants in insurance may be better off if precluded from secur-
ing information about future events that would merely have distributional consequences. The 
reason is that the attempt to acquire the purely distributional information will lead to a social 
deadweight loss. As a result, Hirshleifer reasoned, contrary to the classic economic analysis of 
information, legal prohibitions on the acquisition of such information can enhance social utility. 
Here, there may be similar utilitarian benefits to limited information in the public context. 
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about individual actors and their distinctions may create a greater 
sense of collective identity and responsibility. 107 
Strong political parties and party identification help overcome this 
problem, it is important to emphasize, by reducing the incentive of 
narrow individual constituencies to act on information about their 
self-interest.108 To draw the crude analogy to public choice theory, 
they should help solve the prisoners' dilemma by "depriving" the pub-
lic within a particular congressional district of the information that its 
political representative can offer a "special deal." 109 This lack of 
knowledge helps to decrease the probability that the district will pur-
sue its immediately apparent self-interest. The result is that individual 
members of Congress are more likely to be held accountable for their 
contribution to the general effectiveness of government performance 
than for their narrow, marginal efforts to obtain special advantages for 
their district or for individual constituents. All things being equal, 
therefore, there is less reason for members of Congress to spend time 
distinguishing themselves politically and symbolically from the rest of 
their party. Rather, they will throw their support and assistance to 
the party as a whole, since it is its success, ultimately, that is more 
likely to ensure the individual's reelection. As a result, the political 
influence of diffuse groups should be enhanced. 
Indeed, an analogous argument has been made about the effect of 
political parties and party identification on the incentive for political 
actors to take actions with a longer time horizon. A political party 
that exists as a stable institution extending across careers and political 
generations may tend to mask the temporal distinctions between lead-
107. Of course, some believe there are potential benefits to the breakdown of party identifica-
tion. The dispersion of influence and rise of independent political power accompanying the de-
cline of parties facilitate greater dialogue between individual representatives within Congress and 
between branches of government. Moreover, to the extent that universalism reigns in Congress, 
it may improve the ability of narrower groups, such as traditionally excluded minorities, to se-
cure some institutional representation within the polity, although, absent prejudice, narrow 
groups are generally thought to enjoy organizational advantages in today's political process. See 
Ackerman, supra note 28, at 745-46. 
Finally, from the opposite perspective, the decentralization of power might be thought to 
raise concerns of tyranny or of narrow groups gaining extra influence through their control of 
centralized institutions. The political party's greater emphasis on centralization may not fully 
resolve the internal question - what organization theory would call a principal/agency problem 
- of ensuring that party leaders are responsive to their party constituents. The traditional view 
is that a two party framework ensures a measure of accountability. See Fitts, Vice of Virtue, 
supra note 11, at 1610-12. -
108. Obviously, this is different from the typical law-and-economics or civic virtue solutions 
that seek either to implement a tit-for-tat strategy or to instill altruism or virtue. See R. AXEL-
ROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); R. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON (1988); 
M. TAYLOR, ANARCHY AND COOPERATION (1976); Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enter-
prise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 848-54, 859-62 (1980); Sunstein, supra note 87. 
109. See supra note 15 (describing the prisoners' dilemma). 
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ers of the same party. With this "ignorance" of personal differences 
between party members, there can be less of an incentive, all things 
being equal, to pass off budget deficits or other problems to future 
party decisionmakers, who are linked to present political leaders by 
party ties and popular party identification. In this type of environ-
ment, it is possible that the President and subordinates who will soon 
become party leaders know that the public is more likely to hold the 
party and future party leaders accountable for current policies. Par-
ties and party identification thus would serve to help promote longer 
temporal accountability by masking individual distinctions between 
party successors.110 To the extent that political parties decline as col-
lective institutions extending across administrations and political per-
sonalities, this temporal accountability becomes more attenuated, if 
not broken. Politicians can be more confident that successors within 
the party will not be held responsible for earlier actions, thereby exac-
erbating any temporal collective action problems. 111 
C. Limited Information and Nonideological Political Parties as a 
Benefit in Overcoming Political Stalemate (Model III) 
A third and related way that less information and stronger party 
identification can benefit utilitarian decisionmaking is by obscuring the 
existence of political divisions and issues, thereby facilitating agree-
ment and political action. This is an example of Model III, as outlined 
earlier. 112 
110. As V.O. Key argued: 
Expression of electoral disapprobation ... depends on the existence of political parties with 
some continuity and some sense of corporate accountability. When a President seeks re· 
election, he cannot avoid that accountability; his record is approved or it is not approved. 
When the President's party puts forward a nominee as a successor to the incumbent, the 
candidate must, if the electorate is to be effective, be accountable for the record of his party. 
When such a presidential candidate seeks to work out of such responsibility, he attempts to 
subvert a basic .tenet of the constitutional customs. 
V.O. KEY, PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 474 n.3 (1961). See generally 
Cremer, Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations, 101 Q.J. EcoN. 33 (1986). 
111. The result could be a greater likelihood of such temporal collective action problems as 
budget deficits. See Cogan, supra note 103 (linking the decline of parties to budget deficits). See 
generally]. BUCHANAN & R. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT: THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF 
LORD KEYNES 17-18 (1977) (arguing that deficits are a result of temporal collective action 
problems). 
112. See supra text accompanying note 16. To some extent, the value of political parties in 
improving the rationality of voting, see supra section III.A, while at the same time avoiding some 
issues (as outlined here in section 111.C) might be seen as pursuing objectives that are potentially 
in tension. A similar charge can be made against traditional defenses of pluralism. In this case, 
however, political parties are thought to improve the rationality of voting about those issues on 
the political agenda and to be better able to avoid other potentially destructive issues by keeping 
them off the political agenda. Political party supporters would explain the difference as simply 
"want[ing] to offer voters some choice but not (too much] choice." Orren, The Changing Styles 
of American Party Politics, in THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES 4, 15 (J. Fleish-
man ed. 1982) (emphasis in original). As E.E. Schattschneider observed, "(d]emocracy is not to 
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Of course, the need for agreement is relative and is ordinarily out-
weighed by the fundamental value in confronting 'and resolving social 
issues. It can be necessary, however, to overcome the status quo by 
prioritizing among the infinite number of controversies that can be 
placed on the political agenda. Rawls, for example, has argued that 
avoiding certain issues is a necessity in the modem liberal state.113 
This avoidance is achieved not only by explicit constitutional prohibi-
tion, such as the separation of church and state, 114 but also by the way 
political institutions, such as strong parties and party identification, 
are structured so as to keep political actors focused on some issues and 
not on others - that is, to facilitate ignorance of some issues. This 
process is similar to the manner in which party identification over-
comes interest group universalism, except in this case party identifica-
tion and other related devices can serve to overcome ideological and 
other stalemates. 
1. The Literature on Nonideological Parties 
This controversial argument can be traced to the pluralists, who 
suggested that structures that keep debate focused on today's 
problems, such as incremental budgeting systems, facilitate agreement 
and government action. 115 Because any general rejection of compre-
be found in the parties but between the parties." E. SCHATI'SCHNEIDER, supra note 11, at 60 
(emphasis in original). In this sense, parties can be seen on some dimensions as facilitating polit-
ical clarity - even ideology - and on other dimensions as removing issues from the political 
agenda. 
113. See Rawls, supra note 16; see also Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17 (1987) (calling for a "remov[al] from the political agenda [ofj the 
most divisive issues, pervasive uncertainty and serious contention about which must undermine 
the bases of social cooperation"). As Stephen Holmes has observed: "In a liberal social order, 
the basic normative framework must be able to command the loyalty of individuals and groups 
with widely differing self-understandings and conceptions of personal fulfillment. As a result, 
theorists of justice can achieve their principal aim only by steering clear of irresolvable metaphys-
ical disputes." Holmes, Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
DEMOCRACY 19, 20-21 (J. Bister & R. Slagstad eds. 1988). 
114. See Holmes, supra note 113, at 19-58 (discussing this and a variety of other legal tech-
niques). Sunstein recognizes the benefits of omission in this special case. See Sunstein, supra 
note 49, at 1555 n.85 ("[R]emoval of religion from the political agenda protects republican poli-
tics by ensuring against stalemate and factionalism."). 
115. See A. WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (3d ed. 1979); 
Wildavsky, Rescuing Policy Analysis from PPBS. 29 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 189 (1969); see also A. 
BENTLY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT 447-59 (1908); R. DAHL, supra note 31, at 141-45; c. 
LINDBLOM, supra note 93, at 3-34, 87-101; D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 501-35 
(1951). But cf A. WILDAVSKY, THE "NEW" POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 423-26 
(1988) (recognizing many of the trade-offs involved in this approach). While ignorance of long-
term issues may minimize certain types of analysis, it can have advantages in reaching agree-
ments where there is little to gain from increased scrutiny. Analogous arguments about igno-
rance facilitating moral consensus have been made in the private law literature. See, e.g., G. 
CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 38-39 (1978). 
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hensive analysis is highly questionable, 116 however, the political party 
approach has pursued the benefits of less absolute limitations on 
information. 
Coalitional, as distinguished from ideological, politics is the best 
example. According to this perspective, synoptic·ideological analysis 
often stimulates informational inputs and conflict which can be profit-
ably avoided through a more focused political process. In particular, 
nonideological politics, which deemphasizes any overarching ideologi-
cal framework, is thought to avoid raising some issues, thereby 
"serv[ing] as a method for aggregating popular choices, tying these 
conflicts over courses of action to a broader program, and ... making 
compromise rather than veto the general form of resolution." 117 
For similar reasons, such devices as party identification, closed 
primaries, and centralized party conventions, 118 as well as some re-
strictions on access to decisionmaking and bargaining in Congress and 
executive agencies, 119 are thought to serve as a means of avoiding or 
delaying resolution of some issues by keeping them out of public de-
bate and the public "consciousness."120 Indeed, the increasing use in 
recent years of government commissions appointed by the President or 
Congress to decide major issues of policy, such as the deficit, social 
security, or the future of the MX missile, represents an attempt to re-
create outside the public eye the informal bargaining mechanism 
116. The narrowness of decisionmaking within a pluralist framework has been frequently 
criticized when used as a general model for government decisionmaking. At best, avoidance is 
only an intermediate, not a universal, goal. 
117. Orren, supra note 112, at 5. 
I 18. See N. POLSBY, CONSEQUENCES OF PARTY REFORM (1983); D. PRICE, supra note 78; 
L. SABATO, supra note 1 I. 
119. See s. FRANTZICH, COMPUTERS JN CONGRESS 246-47 (1982) ("With better informa-
tion, members of Congress [are] able to determine not only the aggregate impact of legislation, 
but also the specific impact on their districts, ... heighten[ing] the 'zero sum game' view of 
politics" and "exacerbat[ing] the problem [of decisionmaking] by laying bare the conflicts over 
values or parochial interests that were muted when such information was not readily available."); 
Strauss, supra note 48, at 666 (critizing formalization of Presidential direction over agencies 
because the visibility of this process might lead Congress to "encumber" the system "in ways 
restricting the effectiveness of the President's coordinative apparatus."). Similar observations 
have been made in game theory about the benefits of a "focal point," which avoids bargaining 
over coordination problems. See A. ROTH, AXIOMATIC MODELS OF BARGAINING (1979); T. 
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 70 (1963). For a discussion of the related agenda 
control benefits of political parties, and their value in creating single-peaked preferences, see 
supra note 86. 
120. Nor is this technique foreign to courts. In constitutional law, for example, courts on 
· occasion have left unclear the relative powers of the separate branches in part to facilitate such 
informal compromises between the branches on a case-by-case basis. See Shane, Legal Disagree-
ment and Negotiation in a Government of Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against 
Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461, 501 (1987). An example of this is the doctrine of executive 
privilege. Id. 
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among branches that existed with the parties. 121 While all of these are 
only half-way time-limited measures (complete preclusion would b~ 
quite dangerous) the limits on information in these cases can facilitate 
useful agreement and subsequent action. 122 
2. Civic Virtue and Law-and-Economics Attempts 
To Further Precision 
From a civic virtue perspective, this approach may seem perverse 
- and certainly it is if carried too far. The foundation of rational 
dialogue, indeed the normative defense often advanced for the legiti-
macy of the legal process itself, is the willingness of decisionmakers to 
respond to and deal with challenges. 123 A variety of reforms consis-
tent with the civic virtue perspective, such as the "hard look" doctrine , 
and "proliferation of points of access," are supposed to confront issues 
and to "promote access to sources of public deliberation."124 Simi-
larly, law-and-economics proposals to facilitate greater consistency, 
candor, and oversight through judicial review and statutory construe-
121. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. §§ 351-61 (1988) (establishing the Commission on Executive, Legisla-
tive, and Judicial Salaries); Executive Order No. 12400, 3 C.F.R. 147 (1983) (executive order 
establishing the presidential Commission on Strategic Forces); 10 U.S.C.A. § 2687 (West Supp. 
1989) (authorizing the defense secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure); Om-
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101Stat1330 (1987) (codified at 
2 U.S.C.A. § 901 (West Supp. 1989)) (establishing the National Economic Commission); Execu-
tive Order No. 12335, 3 C.F.R. 217 (1981) (executive order establishing the National Commis-
sion on Social Security Reform). See generally Greenberg & Flick, The New Bipartisan 
Commissions, 1983 J. COMP. STUD. 3, 19. Indeed, the failure of the National Economic Commis-
sion to reach an agreement, in contrast to the success of the social security and base-closing 
commissions, was attributed to the fact that it was subject to an open-meeting requirement. See, 
e.g., MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour (Mar. 1, 1989) (comments of Rep. Frenzel). 
The literature criticizing the "plebiscitary" presidency is based in part on a similar analysis: a 
president whose every act is subject to media attention lacks the ability to facilitate compromise 
and prioritize interests in the resolution of issues. See T. Low1, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT 134-
75 (1985); J. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 173-204 (1987). Of course, presidential or 
congressional commissions can offer another analogous advantage: by lowering the number of 
actors who participate in decisionmaking, they centralize power and help overcome collective 
action problems. 
122. At the same time, of course, incrementalist decisionmaking can be viewed as creating 
information - that is, information about the results of marginal acts, which then can become the 
basis of subsequent decisions. See Diver, supra note 74. 
123. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
124. Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1577; see also id. at 1562 (discussing the "central republican 
understanding that disagreement can be a creative force"); id. at 1581, 1584 (stating that statu-
tory construction should promote "consistency," "coordination," "political accountability," and 
"high visibil[ity]"); Bruff, supra note 28, at 238 ("[H]ard look review could play the same legiti-
mizing role in administrative law that the jurisprudential school of 'reasoned elaboration' once 
held out for the courts themselves through norms of neutral, consistent, and candid decisional 
processes."); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 134 (1980) (criticizing legislators' "propensity 
not to make politically controversial decisions - to leave them instead to others, most often 
others who are not elected or effectively controlled by those who are"); cf Stewart, supra note 46, 
at 1695 ("Individual politicians often find far more to be lost than gained in taking a readily 
identifiable stand on a controversial issue of social or economic policy."). 
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tion (that is, to further a legal and political cost-benefit analysis) are 
intended to force the public and decisionmakers to deal openly with 
problems. 125 As a practical matter, political candidates and parties are 
routinely castigated in the popular press for not offering the details of 
their programs or downplaying internal divisions. The presumption is 
that such obfuscation undermines the electoral connection, namely, 
the responsiveness of political representatives to the instrumental 
needs and desires of their constituents, and prevents the development 
of an effective rational dialogue. 126 
In support of the view that greater information will not cause stale-
mate, civic virtue scholars suggest that an ideological normative dis-
cussion should promote a convergence of views on social principles. 
That is because justifications must be proffered in terms of general nor-
mative ideals and not narrow utilitarian benefit. Where deci-
sionmakers are less focused on their own personal utilitarian 
advantage, it is supposed, they will be more likely to converge on first 
principles, which are presumed to be consensual. If that is true, it 
would seem unnecessary to reduce dialogue and information in the 
way suggested above, since ideological confrontation on issues should 
ultimately lead to a rough consensus.127 
Whatever the attraction of this perspective in an ideal world, 128 the 
party approach .suggests that an ideological debate in a real-world 
political environment, where people are aware of their self-interests 
125. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 25, at 354 (urging the courts to review legislation for 
"consistency" between ends and means in order "to increase the accountability of the legislature 
to the voting public and to improve deliberation within Congress"); Macey, supra note 41, at 251 
(calling for system of statutory construction to promote candor and "public regarding goals"). 
126. According to the textual analysis, if candidates and parties were forced to be open and 
clearer, the responsiveness of our government, as measured by its utilitarian performance, would 
be enhanced. For discussion of the other reasons offered for ambiguity, see generally Campbell, 
Ambiguity in the Issue Positions of Presidential Candidates: A Causal Analysis, 27 AM. J. PoL. 
Ser. 284 (1983); Shepsle, The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition, 66 
AM. POL. Ser. REV. 555 (1972). 
127. See Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1550 ("The requirement of deliberation embodies sub-
stantive limitations that in some settings lead to uniquely correct outcomes."); id. ("The require-
ment of deliberation is designed to ensure that political outcomes will be supported by reference 
to a consensus (or at least broad agreement) among political equals."); id. at 1554 ("[R]epublican 
approaches posit the existence of a common good, to be found at the conclusion of a welt-func-
tioning deliberative process."); Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, supra note 49, at 24 
(While "[m]y reading of the history will not show the standard version mistaken in its ascriptions 
to republicanism of either the objectivism of public good or the teleology of civic virtue[,] I wish 
rather to suggest why the civic ideal retains its hold despite its insults to modern sensibilities."). 
128. Civic virtue writers have recognized the tensions within an objective view of morality. 
See, e.g., Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, supra note 49, at 24 ("[T]he civic ideal retains 
its hold despite its insults to modern liberal sensibilities."). See generally C. BAKER, supra note 
10, at 22 ("Our limited rationality and the absence of objective truth undermine[] any basis for 
confidence that the marketplace w[ill] lead to wisdom."); F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILO-
SOPHICAL ENQUIRY 34 (1982). 
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and their ideologies differ, can often exacerbate divisions and under-
mine the ability to reach a consensus. There are two related reasons. 
First, as a general matter, ideological politics tends to raise the stakes 
of the debate because it requires a consistency in judgment that neces-
sarily precludes everybody from getting "some but never all of what 
[they] want."I29 Compromise on the issue at hand can thus be more 
difficult. Second, this effect is important not only for the resolution of 
the question at issue, but also for other issues. By definition, when 
issues are resolved ideologically, a decision about one issue can effec-
tively decide a host of other issues because it is logically connected by 
the ideology. I30 As a result, the stakes of the discussion in an ideologi-
cal debate are higher because more potential interests are affected. 131 
For both of these reasons, the political party literature suggests that 
the value in confronting all issues must be balanced against the media-
tion and consensus-forming benefits of coalitional politics, which in 
effect keep us unfocused on the long-term or "logical" implications of 
our actions. Political parties and centralizing structures such as party 
identification "represent[ ] the triumph of pragmatic compromise over 
ideological purity that is an essential feature of American politics."132 
129. A. RANNEY & W. KENDALL, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM 508 
(1956) (emphasis omitted). Problems over budget negotiations illustrate the tension. After pas-
sage of the 1974 Budget Control Act, each budget item was to be reevaluated in a classic compre-
hensive approach. See A. SCHICK, RECONCILIATION AND THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
PROCESS 34 (1981). It was no longer "possible to swap an increase here for a decrease there or 
for an increase elsewhere without always having to consider the ultimate desirability of programs 
blatantly in competition." A. WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS, supra 
note 115, at 136-37. 
130. See Miller, supra note 31, at 740 (noting that ideological politics ordinarily "entails a 
large set of universal losers likely to be deeply alienated by the political system"). 
131. Curiously, this analysis is the exact opposite of the familiar refrain that ideological de-
bate is the worst and most virulent because there is nothing at issue. Indeed, there is something 
at issue, but it is something that allows of no compromise - right and wrong, truth or justice, 
the structure of the society - and, therefore, can be more significant. 
This argument, it should be pointed out, is consistent with the veil-of-ignorance discussion 
explored in the next section, which examines the potential value of ideological discussions that 
occur behind a veil of ignorance or a true real-world substitute. If decisions are delegated to 
administrative agency personnel whose constant turnover complicates any prediction .as to their 
future decisions, or are embodied in constitutional amendments where future application by 
courts are truly unclear, winners and losers may be less apparent, even though the discussion has 
major social significance and is truly ideological. Consensus might be possible. See infra notes 
172-77 and accompanying text. In a real-world political debate that is not subject to a "veil," 
however, the impact of ideologies on other contexts and interests is more obvious. If political 
institutions require that discussion be both comprehensive and rational, political agreement as a 
general matter may be less achievable. 
132. Orren, supra note 112, at 27. Indeed, it may be the case that imprecision, as advocated 
in the literatures on pluralist incrementalism and nonideological parties, should be recognized as 
a real-world means of promoting a civic virtue dialogue as well. On a fundamental level, the goal 
of dialogue, indeed its very justification, is to reach some degree of certainty. A system that 
converges on such truths, however, will extinguish any need or incentive for continued dialogue. 
For this reason, institutions that promote uncertainty and imprecision can be viewed as ensuring 
a continued institutional dialogue; common law decisionmaking and interest group pluralism, the 
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D. The Decline of Party Identification: A Case Study in the 
Instrumental and Utilitarian Problems with Increasing 
Information 
The utilitarian and instrumental benefits of limited information, 
discussed above in terms of the political party model, find some factual 
support in the problems associated with the decline of party identifica-
tion and party strength over the past thirty years. As numerous schol-
ars have detailed, party identification within the electorate and party 
strength more generally have diminished, especially since the 1950s, 
with a majority of the voters now identifying themselves as either in-
dependents or only loosely affiliated with a party. 133 This decline is 
especially noteworthy given the fact that the United States, with its 
dispersed political structure, has never had particularly strong parties, 
two greatest "antagonists" of civic virtue, are perhaps the clearest examples. See E. LEVI, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948); see also supra note 93. The incremental institu-
tional decisionmaking intrinsic to pluralist processes, and to a lesser extent nonideological par-
ties, focuses clearly on immediate problems and, at the same time, ensures a continued exchange 
of views and dialogue over time. 
In the end, this paradox illustrates the fundamental tension within civic virtue writing itself 
about dialogue and objective truth, that is, between objective and community truths. The work 
of Michael Walzer is a good example. See M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983). For a 
recent legal discussion of some aspects of this tension, see Kahn, supra note 86; Post, supra note 
63. Put simply, if there are in fact correct answers, why need institutions for the dialogue be 
eternal? Pluralism and nonideological parties seek to resolve this conflict in a particularly 
noncivic-republican manner. Limitations on information and dialogue, under this approach, 
serve as systems for institutionalizing a continuing discussion. 
133. See w. CROTIY, AMERICAN PARTIES IN DECLINE (1984); N. NIE, s. VERBA & J. 
PETROCIK, THE CHANGING AMERICAN VOTER (1979); M. WATTENBERG, supra note 78. In-
deed, one political scientist has gone as far as to say: 
In a world in which political scientists disagree on almost everything, there is remarkable 
agreement among the political science profession ... that the strength of American political 
parties has declined significantly over the past several decades. Regardless of how one meas-
ures partisanship - by personal party identification within the electorate, by party disci-
pline in Congress, or by the vitality of party machinery - there is massive evidence attesting 
to the weakened condition of the parties in the United States. 
Orren, supra note 112, at 31. 
There is evidence in recent years, however, of an increase in party fundraising, as well as 
party voting and strength in Congress, especially on procedural issues. It is a subject of intense 
debate whether or in what sense this represents a resurgence of party influence. See, e.g., Schles-
inger, The New American Political Party, 19 AM. PoL. Sci. REV. 1152 (1985). Without doubt, 
however, the focus of parties has become more national, as state party organizations have de-
clined more precipitously. Id. In a forthcoming book, Gary Cox and Mathew Mccubbins argue 
that the decline-of-party thesis is especially overstated in the case of Congress. See G. Cox & M. 
MCCUBBINS, PARTIES AND COMMITTEES IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Nov. 
1989 draft on file with the author). Regardless of whether one accepts their ultimate conclusions, 
their thesi_s is predicated on the continuing viability of party identification in the electorate and 
the resulting interest of individual congressmen in a small collective body such as Congress in 
supporting party centralization in Congress and party efforts. While they appear to be more 
optimistic than some other political scientists on the continuing strength of party identification, 
their explanation of its overall impact appears to be consistent with the thesis of this article. For 
a historical' and institutional explanation for the recent rise in party voting in Congress at the 
same time as party influence has declined nationally, see B. GINSBURG & M. SHEFTER, POLITICS 
BY OTHER MEANS: THE DECLINING IMPORTANCE OF ELECTIONS JN AMERICA 94-100 (1990). 
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especially at the national level, as compared to some foreign countries 
such as Great Britain. 
While exceedingly complicated, the reasons for the drop lie partly 
in the proliferation of political resources that has made possible the 
dissemination of information independent of the parties. In particular, 
individual members of Congress have an improved ability to commu-
nicate directly with the public because of increased opportunities for 
individual candidate financing and PAC support; 134 increases in dis-
tributive legislation in the post-New Deal state;135 constituency serv-
icing; 136 greater popular education that has made examination of 
individual differences among candidates more appealing; 137 and, per-
haps most important, heightened media attention toward individual 
candidates.138 In addition, on the state level, the disaggregation of 
political offices, whereby individual positions are elected at off-years, 
minimizes the dependence of individual candidates on party or group 
performance or assistance. 139 In this environment, individual politi-
cians - especially incumbents - are better able than in the past to 
distinguish themselves from their party by emphasizing single issues, 
personality, and symbolic stands. In general, "the media have sup-
planted political parties as the main connecting rods between candi-
dates and voters, providing citizens with their only real information 
during the campaign."140 As Morris Fiorina puts it, "Candidates 
would have little incentive to operate campaigns independent of the 
parties if there were no means to apprise the citizenry of their indepen-
dence. The media provide the means."141 In this situation we have a 
134. See L. SABATO, PAC POWER (1985). 
135. See M. FIORINA, supra note 30, at 37-47. 
136. See id. 
137. E. LADD & C. HADLEY, TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM 15-16 
(1975). 
138. See A. WARE, THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC PARTY ORGANIZATION, 1940-
1980, at 241 (1985) (noting that critical to the breakdown of parties was "the development of new 
technologies which could be employed in political campaigning, and the resources which helped 
incumbents, especially legislators, to divorce themselves from the nominating and electoral activ-
ities of their party's organizations"); Richardson, supra note 78, at 700 (concluding that greater 
party influence in Japan as compared to the United States is due to the fact that in Japan, unlike 
the United States, the electorate is exposed regularly to information about parties but only inter-
mittently to information about candidates). See generally J. CLUBB, W. FLANIGAN & N. ZIN-
GALE, supra note 89, at 278-86 (decline of party identification and strength occurred when "[t]he 
national information flow increased, became more varied and pervasive ... , strain[ing] the 
parties as mechanisms of political mobilization, [] integration, and policy formation"). 
139. W. BURNHAM, supra note 92, at 94. 
140. Orren, supra note 112, at 31. 
141. Fiorina, The Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Politics, 109 DAEDALUS, 
Summer 1980, at 25, 33; see Orren, Thinking about the Press and Government, in IMPACT: How 
THE PRESS AFFECTS FEDERAL POLICYMAKING 10 (M. Linsky ed. 1986) (quoting James Barber 
as saying: "The media in the United States are the new political parties. The old political parties 
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more dispersed dialogue. 
To some extent, this phenomenon suggests that "the candidate, the 
issue, [and] the particular events of the immediate campaign" may 
count more now than in the past. Obviously, in certain respects this is 
a political benefit. As two authors put it: 
[I]n the contemporary environment of weak partisan loyalties and large 
numbers of independents, the potential of the campaign for shaping 
voter perceptions of the candidates may be higher than it has ever been. 
As long-term voter commitments to [a] party becomes less important, 
short-term impressions come to predominate.142 
There is a trade-off, however, in terms of the three benefits of party 
identification and strength described above. Most importantly: 
[S]uch patterns [do not] represent an increase in voter rationality. "Can-
didate appeal" is often based on the most superficial, contrived kind of 
media image. "Major issues" are too often a few isolated, symbolically 
potent issues that happen to be "hot" at the moment - frequently as a 
result of skilled advertising. And incumbent voting has loosened the 
link, not only between the issue positions of individual voters and their 
representatives, but also between national public opinion trends and 
Congress as a whole.143 
The resulting behavior is often "less political in a broad, program-
matic sense than the reliance on party loyalties and identifications that 
it replaces."144 • 
are gone."); M. WATIENBURG, supra note 78, at 100 ("Through the media, congressional candi-
dates now have the capability of making themselves far more visible than in the past, and to the 
degree that their campaigns are run independently of party one would expect a decline in the 
saliency and intensity of partisan attitudes in the electorate."). 
142. See F. SAUROF & P. BECK, supra note 79, at 295. 
143. D. PRICE, supra note 78, at 110. As Saurof and Beck point out: 
Recent campaigns have witnessed tremendous swings in public support for candidates right 
up to election day and an increase in the effectiveness of personal attacks by opponents and 
single-issue groups through negative television advertising, both signs of an electorate that 
lacks deep-seated commitments to candidates or to parties. 
F. SAUROF & P. BECK, supra note 79, at 296 (footnote omitted). 
144. F. SAUROF & P. BECK, supra note 79, at 488; see also Fiorina, supra note 141, at 44 (this 
"system ... articulates interests superbly but aggregates them poorly"); Martin Wattenberg 
suggests: 
The party symbol performs a crucial linkage in the representation process because the "con-
stituency can infer the candidates' position with more than random accuracy even though 
what the constituency has learned directly about these stands is almost nothing." With 
parties becoming increasingly less likely to perform this linkage and without voter knowl-
edge of congressional candidates' positions, the chances for faithful representation are 
clearly reduced. 
M. WATIENBERG, supra note 78, at 112 (footnote omitted) (quoting Miller & Stokes, Constitu-
ency Influence in Congress, in ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICAL ORDER 371 (A. Campbell ed. 
1966)). 
This process may affect the presidency as well. In the past, when presidents were chosen by 
party leaders and relied on party support and political identification for the election, the vote for 
the president was more often a decision on parties than on individual candidates. Today, in 
contrast, with independent primaries and independent candidate campaign organizations, the 
selection of the president is based less on party evaluations and more on public assessments of the 
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This confusion can have an effect on political participation as well. 
Unable to rely on the simplicity of political parties, the public, espe-
cially the poor and less educated, often appears to care less about poli-
tics that it does not understand. 145 This has been accompanied by an 
unprecedented decline in voter turnouts, which can be attributed in 
part to the drop in party identification. 146 
Beyond these instrumental problems, moreover, some believe there 
is evidence of a utilitarian cost, both in the increased dominance of 
special interest groups, and the heightened ideological divisions and 
stalemate that have been associated with the absence of strong parties. 
With the drop in party identification and party influence generally, 
many members of Congress seem to have found it easier, all things 
being equal, to build an independent constituency through pork barrel 
projects and constituent servicing. The result, as political scientists 
character and personality of individual candidates. The result may be what several political 
scientists call a "personal president" or a "rhetorical president," who is more subject to immedi-
ate public pressures and assessment. This may also mean a decline in the traditional principaV 
agency relationship between populace and president, and, according to some prominent scholars, 
in the likelihood of institutional effectiveness. See T. Low1, supra note 121; J. Tuus, supra note 
121; see also supra note 87 (discussing political advantages of a principaVagency relationship). A 
somewhat analogous concern regarding the dwarfing of "soft" or "complex" variables underlies 
the anxiety over too searching judical review of agency decisionmaking. See, e.g., Strauss, Con-
sidering Political Alternatives to Hard Look, 1989 DUKE L.J. 538, 549-50. 
145. Michael McGerr describes how old-style party identification helped overcome the col-
lective action problem: 
A man's decision to vote at a particular election did not depend solely on the allure of a 
candidate, the interest of an issue, or the closeness "on election; instead, his vote became a 
testament, regularly given, to his persisting identification with one of the parties. 
M. McGERR, supra note 81, at 41; see also Burnham, supra note 32, at 132 ("[T]he relative 
disappearance of partisan terms in campaigns and their replacement by personalistic and imagis-
tic appeals to voters create conditions that make utility calculations difficult, if not impossible, 
[with the result that] some people will remain far better positioned to make accurate utility 
calculations than others."); R. ENTMAN, supra note 84, at 137 ("The decline of participation in 
the U.S. has historically paralleled the dwindling of the partisan press and the rise of objectiv-
ity."); Abramson & Aldrich, The Decline of Electoral Participation in America, 76 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 502 (1982). This is not to argue that all historically excluded groups are necessarily disad-
vantaged by this decline. As noted above, some politicians (Jesse Jackson, for example), have 
certainly been quite successful in opening up political structures in particular cases. 
146. Walter Burnham summarized this connection: 
Inchoate politics, fragmented electoral choices, and personalistic campaign images lead nat-
urally to growth in the number of citizens who have a low sense of their external political 
efficacy; more citizens who find it difficult or impossible to make a utility calculation differ-
ent from zero (or perhaps make one at all); and general erosion of the strength of party 
identification. As politicians' incentives at elections shift more and more to considerations 
of "every person for himself," the notion of collective will tends to disappear; and so, in a 
highly selective way, does the active electorate. 
Burnham, supra note 32, at 123-24 (footnote omitted). 
In earlier days, party identification served to filter out many of these individualistic considera-
tions, and highlighted the relationship of the candidate to general political and social interests 
that are often obscured by expanded and diverse political debate. As David Price observed: 
"The idea of 'voting for the person and not the party' fits nicely with the individualistic and 
moralistic strain of American political culture, but neither the virtue nor the rationality of such a 
stance will bear careful scrutiny." D. PRICE, supra note 78, at 110. 
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have shown, is an environment more conducive to the political univer-
salism described above. 147 At the same time, greater ideological orien-
tation in Congress appears to have led at times to greater stalemate as 
well.148 
E. Political Party and Other Reforms as an Attempt 
To Channel Information 
Despite the benefits of strong parties, party identification, and 
more limited information, it is probably neither possible nor advisable 
to create a strong party system in the form experienced at various 
times in our history, 149 or in some other countries. For one, resources 
that were valuable historically in the United States in sustaining 
stronger parties - notably, extensive graft and patronage - are no 
longer politically or constitutionally available. 150 In addition, the in-
creased dialogue and diverse participation accompanying the decline 
of parties have probably provided benefits, especially among previ-
ously dispossessed groups, such as blacks, in both substantive influ-
ence and participation. 151 Finally, while less information may have 
offered advantages in a pre-technological age when ignorance did not 
depend upon active government suppression of information, it would 
be dangerous to attempt to reconstruct that state today, given the po-
tential for tyrannical governmental overreaching. 
In light of the instrumental benefits of more limited information 
described above, however, there are reforms that may be useful meth-
ods for channeling information away from narrow constituencies and 
toward centralized institutions. They would not, and given our polit-
ical structure probably could not, create truly strong parties. Rather, 
these proposals would, as some have recommended, simply "restrict[ ] 
access to resources and opportunities that would allow legislat[ors and 
other politicians] to build strong personal ties to their con-
stituen[ts]."152 In other words, they would seek to decrease the sali-
ence and recognition of narrow group activities - in effect erecting a 
147. See Fitts, Vices of Virtue, supra note 11, at 1628-31 (summarizing the history of this 
phenomenon). 
148. Id. 
149. For an excellent description of politics during the late 1800s and early 1900s, see M. 
McGERR, supra note 81. 
150. See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (prohibiting dismissal of certain govern· 
ment employees based on party allegiance); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (holding that the 
practice of patronage dismissals violates the first and fourteenth amendments). 
151. See Ackerman, supra note 28, at 744-46; see also supra notes 61-65 and accompanying 
text. 
152. B. CAINE, J. FEREJOHN & M. FIORINA, supra note 105, al 14. 
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veil of ignorance around them - while, in some cases, also accentuat-
ing the activities of more centralized political units. In a sense, they 
represent modem-day attempts to reintroduce some modest reduc-
tions in information. When they are justified depends to a large extent 
on how factually significant the effects outlined above tum out to be in 
individual cases. 
1. Coattail Effects 
One example is the proposal to move the election of members of 
Congress to several weeks after the presidential election.153 The pur-
pose of this change is to increase the salience of that election, that is, 
its "coattail effects," in much the same way that party identification in 
the earlier days overwhelmed the peculiarities of local candidates. By 
linking the presidential and congressional candidates of the same party 
in a web of interconnecting interest, the party label would be empha-
sized and the party strengthened. The result would be a decreased 
focus on individual candidate behavior and an increased focus on 
group responsibility. Proposals to move state elections from off-years 
to coincide with federal elections have similar purposes in terms of 
strengthening national parties.154 
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, other proposals seek to 
minimize the independent voice of individual candidates. These in-
clude attempts to decrease the financial resources and influence of in-
dividual candidates by, for example, reducing their franking privileges; 
placing limits on PAC contributions and ending open primaries; im-
proving the financial and other resources of parties, including their 
patronage; and ending the limits on outside contributions to parties. 155 
153. See J. SUNDQUIST, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 93-98 
(1986); Cutler, Party Government Under the American Constitution, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 25, 38 
(1985). . 
154. See J. SUNDQUIST, supra note 153, at 95-98; Sundquist, Needed: A Political Theory for 
the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States, 103 POL Sci. Q. 613, 631 (1988); 
Cutler, supra note 153, at 38; F. SAUROF & P. BECK, supra note 79, at 278 n.8. Of course, to the 
extent that one views divided government as a result of an intentional decision of the voting 
public, cf Fiorina, supra note 85, this change would have less impact. 
155. Morris Fiorina has considered a prohibition on contributions to individual candidates. 
See Fiorina, supra note 141, at 45 n.30 ("party cohesion would no doubt be strengthened by 
revising existing statutes to prevent ticket splitting voting and to permit campaign contributions 
only to parties"). Other proposals do not go so far, though their objective is the same. See 
Sabato, Real and Imagined Corruption in Campaign Financing, in ELECTIONS AMERICAN 
STYLE, supra note 32, at 168 ("The long-term objective is clear: beef up the parties so that P ACs 
[and individual candidates) will be limited indirectly."). Pursuing similar objectives, others have 
called for direct public subsidization of a party media. See R. ENTMAN, supra note 84, at 136-37 
(defending proposal on grounds that "[t]he decline of participation in the U.S. has historically 
paralleled the dwindling of the partisan press and the rise of objectivity; perhaps an injection of 
party media would reverse the trend"). 
Of course, civic virtue proponents have called for limitations on PACs, but ordinarily on 
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In order for these proposals to have a significant impact, constitutional 
impediments to some of these limitations might need to be relaxed. 156 
2. Government Secrecy 
Several other changes might serve to reduce the informational ad-
vantages of special interest groups, as well as to facilitate compromise, 
by creating occasional exceptions to the general trend toward greater 
sunshine legislation. Decisionmakers might consider, for example, 
making the floor votes of individual members of Congress secret in 
some cases (though not the aggregate tally); closing more congres-
sional meetings to the public; and closing more administrative agency 
operations to public view, including ending ex parte contacts. 157 Any 
restriction on initial public access, though, would need to be accompa-
nied by increased presidential and party involvement; the change 
would be acceptable only if there were greater central political partici-
pation and therefore political accountability for the resulting 
decisions. 
Although this is not the place to attempt to delineate any particu-
lar cases, some contexts, such as the establishment of overall budget 
levels in the legislative branch, transmission of agency budgets to Con-
gress by executive agencies, and generation of the executive branch 
regulatory agenda, seem to be fruitful cases for study. Indeed, some 
recent budgetary and regulatory reforms have moved in this direction, 
sometimes with the approval of civic virtue adherents. 158 If successful, 
the public would focus less on the marginal advantage of specific deci-
sions or actions taken by their individual representatives, and would 
concern itself instead with the overall party product. At the same 
time, more central political actors, such as high executive officials and 
party leaders, would need to be forced by law to participate more visi-
bly, making them more responsible to the public for the outcome. 
Certainly, there are important trade-offs and dangers implicit in 
any attempts to limit information, especially if they are applied to the 
redistributive grounds. While I am sympathetic to those reasons, that is not the rationale I am 
advancing here. 
156. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (F.E.C. Act provisions limit-
ing certain campaign contributions invalidated under first amendment). 
157. See S. FRANTZICH, supra note 119, at 238-39 ("[W]ith more recorded votes, members of 
Congress are on display and can ill afford to be known as people who forsake constituent con-
cerns in the pursuit of party loyalty,'' resulting in "reduced .•. power of the leadership."); 
Greenberg & Flick, supra note 121, at 19-20 (arguing that stalemate and the enhanced influence 
of narrow constituencies in Congress is due to breakdown of the parties and to enhanced public 
scrutiny). 
158. See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 452-63. 
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adjudicative context.159 No one is calling for a return to secrecy in 
government, only greater sensitivity to the political costs of total and 
immediate disclosure. While any change would need to be carefully 
identified so as to not undermine other dialogic and participation val-
ues, there appear to be specific cases where limiting political informa-
tion may achieve public benefits.160 
3. Government Commissions 
In light of this analysis, the value and problems of presidential 
commissions with less clear institutional accountability can also be 
better understood. Over the past few years, there have been numerous 
attempts to erect blue ribbon, high-visibility boards to resolve divisive 
budgetary and political issues such as the deficit, social security, or the 
closing of military bases.161 In these instances, Congress and the Pres-
ident have delegated decisionmaking on specific issues to independent 
commissions with broad mandates to come up with "solutions" for 
particular problems. While in some cases boards are given final deci-
sionmaking authority, plans are usually submitted to Congress for ap-
proval. Obviously, since the original plans could have been considered 
by Congress without commission review, the rationale for the estab-
lishment of commissions, apart from some special expertise of their 
members, appears to be to bind Congress and the general public mor-
ally and politically to the resulting solution. 
A large part of the appeal of this device is its informational insula-
tion. Ideally, the commission may serve, much like traditional party 
identification, to help insulate representatives from constituent and 
special interest group pressures, erecting a veil over the process of 
decisionmaking and giving the commission's resulting proposal a pub-
lic interest veneer once it is introduced back into Congress.162 In addi-
159. In some cases, special interest groups may have better knowledge of what is occurring 
behind closed doors, so this veil would have the effect of increasing their informational advantage 
over the public. Moreover, there is a constant concern about the potential for tyranny. As I 
have suggested previously, however, it is not clear whether stronger centralized power in a two-
party sense may not reduce the possibility of tyranny. See Fitts, Vices of Virtue, supra note 11, at 
1610-12. 
160. This argument is discussed again below. See infra notes 217-26 and accompanying text. 
161. See supra note 121. 
162. See Greenberg & Flick, supra note 121, at 19 ("Opening up" of congressional process so 
that representatives are no longer insulated from interest group pressure by party strength has 
"so complicated and burdened the legislative bargaining process that recourse to commissions 
... [becomes] almost inevitable."). Unlike the traditional New Deal agency, moreover, which 
over time has established strong links to congressional oversight committees and to special inter-
est groups concerned with its activities, the high-level commissions can be more insulated from 
such input. Thus, they can be less likely to suffer from the traditional problem of special interest 
groups being advantaged by a partial veil. See infra notes 163 and 207-11 and accompanying 
text. 
964 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:917 
tion, and equally important, the commission permits bargaining 
outside the formal spotlight of existing legal institutions, hopefully fa-
cilitating consensus. While there are obvious problems with this tech-
nique, especially if the commission takes the form of the traditional 
New Deal agency where no single central figure ultimately assumes 
responsibility for its decisions, 163 it has served as a modem-day substi-
tute for the parties on some issues where it is limited in time and sub-
ject matter and has overall high public visibility for its finished 
product. 
4. Increasing Voting Turnout 
Finally, recent attempts to deal with declining voter turnout by 
withholding information about election returns and polls can be valua-
ble for somewhat similar reasons. Voting creates the same type of 
prisoners' dilemma as do special interest groups. 'If the public votes 
only for narrow instrumental reasons, individual citizens should not 
make an effort to vote, since their vote has almost no likelihood of 
affecting the outcome. 164 Unfortunately, to the extent that everybody 
fails to vote, this understanding undermines all of our interests by end-
ing or perverting the electoral connection. 
Yet the vote has not always been perceived in as cynical a way. 
Party identification originally helped to fill this void. Part of the rea-
son individuals voted was that they ignored the distinction between 
individual and group (collective) action, believing in the party as al-
most a mythical symbol. Voting was a group, not an individual, activ-
ity. Thus, just as party identification is a symbol that leads individuals 
to pursue group interests and may minimize the prisoners' dilemma of 
special interest government, so the general myths of party identifica-
tion can lead individuals to ignore their narrow self-interest on the 
decision of whether to vote at all. 165 Quite simply, our ignorance of 
163. See e.g .• M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 172 
(1955). Thus, in the case of permanent low-level commissions the insulation may serve' to exacer-
bate the influence of specialized constituencies. See McEachern, Federal Advisory Commissions 
in an Economic Model of Representative Democracy, 54 PUB. CHOICE 41 (1987); Petracca, Fed-
eral Advisory Committees, Interest Groups and the Administrative State, 13 CONG. & PRES. 83 
(1976). In addition, it also should be recognized that some aspects of the veil often appear to be 
more apparent than real. When the proposals on legislative and judicial salaries were ultimately 
submitted back to Congress, for example, individual members of Congress were clearly held 
accountable for their decisions, and the increase was defeated. For a discussion of the separa-
tion-of-powers aspects of such commissions, and their potential value in furthering a veil of igno-
rance and political consensus, see infra note 211. 
164. See N. FROHLICH & J. OPPENHEIMER, MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY 97-107 (1978); 
R. HARDIN, supra note 14, at l l; Meehl, The Selfish Voter Paradox and the Thrown-Away Vote 
Argument, 71 AM. POL. SCI. REV. l l (1977). 
165. See M. McGERR, supra note 81, at 39-41. 
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and failure to focus on the "logic of collective action" can help to save 
us from the perverse consequences of collective action. 166 
In light of this historical benefit of ignorance, and of the continuing 
decline in voting in recent years, 167 there are various changes that can 
best be understood as seeking to reinforce the ignorance of the collec-
tive implications of the voting decision. For example, the periodic ef-
fort to prohibit public opinion polls from being taken during the last 
few weeks before elections, or to stop the networks from announcing 
the election results in some states before the polls have closed in 
others, are attempts to reinforce the ignorance of the collective impli-
cations of the voting decision. 168 These changes seek to divert the fo-
cus away from the individual's impact on group activity. The failure 
to release this information is supposed to help maintain the belief that 
your vote is important, even though it is virtually impossible in a pres-
idential election that an individual vote will matter in any case, regard-
less of what the last polls or television returns show. While 
incremental, these changes illustrate another possible value of limited 
information. 
F. Implications for Civic Virtue and Law-and-Economics Theory 
The proposals discussed above are admittedly modest and preca-
tory. My purpose is to sketch the outlines of some doctrinal and struc-
tural changes that appear to further the party approach, give a sense of 
their direction, and underscore their potential tension with the civic 
virtue and law-and-economics approaches. 
As noted above, the civic virtue tradition seeks to structure gov-
ernment so as to "proliferate points of access" to legislative and ad-
ministrative decisionmaking and to expand the dissemination of 
information opportunities.169 Law-and-economics proposals to facili-
tate disclosure of information can have similar effects.17° Taken indi-
vidually and on an elite level, there are benefits to many of these 
changes; they serve, for example, to illuminate the implicit biases of 
166. See D. MUELLER, supra note 37, at 122-24 (finding that voter participation increases 
with closeness of elections). There are also important participational and noninstrumental bene-
fits to voting. See, e.g., Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Govern-
ment Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930, 950-53 (1988). Public behavior reflects this conclusion: much 
of the public still votes, despite awareness of the collective action problem, partly because they 
view the decision to vote noninstrumentally. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 87, at 893-94, 
907. 
167. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text. 
168. See, e.g., Blum, Polling an Attorney for Advice, Natl. L.J., Nov. 21, 1988, at 10. 
169. See supra notes 49-66 and accompanying text. 
170. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. 
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particular proposals and marginal costs. On a systemic political level, 
however, there can be trade-offs, especially on the political and electo-
ral system. A general public that finds it difficult to make sense of 
complex dialogue and 'splintered government institutions may, at the 
same time, find it increasingly difficult to understand, care about, or 
participate in such a general political environment. Compromise and 
agreement may also be more difficult. Political and legal institutions 
should be designed to take account of both effects, which can be in 
tension with one another. 
The proposals outlined above are offered as exceptions to common 
civic virtue or law-and-economics approaches, and serve to channel 
information and public attention to more centralized institutions. In 
particular, the bulk of the proposals to strengthen political parties seek 
to decrease the independent financial or structural ability of en-
trepreneurial actors to engage in some forms of public dialogue and, in 
some cases, to increase the influence of centralized institutions such as 
the parties. In a sense, they change the matrix payoff of information, 
moving it to support more centralized institutions. No one suggests 
that any institution should be given the power to determine what infor-
mation should be disclosed, that is, to limit it by prohibition; concerns 
about tyranny and lack of diverse participation preclude that. 171 The 
way political institutions are organized and the way financial resources 
are deployed in these cases, however, can serve an intermediate role by 
shaping the manner in which issues and programs are presented to the 
public. 
IV. LIMITED INFORMATION AS A NORMATIVE BENEFIT IN 
DECISIONMAKING: VEILS OF IGNORANCE (MODEL IV) 
Up to now I have focused on the three instrumental advantages to 
more limited information - improved rationality, utilitarian effi-
ciency, and political agreement. In this section, I turn to examine a 
fourth model, a type of veil of ignorance which offers a normative ad-
vantage in decisionmaking. This benefit can be achieved in theory by 
excising information about the effect of a decision on different groups, 
thereby erecting something like a real-world veil of ignorance around 
the consequences of social policy for individual groups' interests. If 
successful, this may help promote a rational dialogue and forge a polit-
ical consensus. 112 
171. The first amendment generally and appropriately serves as a limitation on such 
intervention. 
172. In theory, the consequences for political decisionmaking of such limitations can be 
three-fold. First, by eliminating self-interest, the veil can serve to stimulate a rational dialogue 
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While the use of the often-mentioned but seldom-examined device 
of a veil of ignorance is subject to some theoretical and practical 
problems that will be developed below, I argue that it has been suc-
cessful in one important structural public law case related directly to 
the thesis of this article: party turnover within a government of sepa-
rated powers. In other words, the veil has been promoted by a well-
functioning two-party system. Conversely, it appears to have been un-
dermined by changes advanced at different times in the law-and-eco-
nomics and civic virtue literatures. 
A. A Theory of the Veil of Ignorance 
Establishing a true veil of ignorance in the real world is obviously a 
difficult if not impossible task. In general, partial veils of ignorance 
can be created in public decisionmaking through any technique that 
serves to introduce a structural impediment to a clear identification of 
the ultimate winners and losers in a public decision. While it is unnec-
essary to catalogue all of the specific cases, the most prominent is a 
constitutional amendment. 173 In addition, statutes that are expected 
which, to the extent that our society enjoys a dominant consensual ideology with respect to a 
particular issue, helps to forge a consensus. Second, to the extent that the ideology is Rawlsian 
or utilitarian, the limitations could create incentives for income redistribution. Finally, a limita-
tion on information which is complete, that is, which serves effectively to avoid a particular issue, 
may avoid destructive philosophical divisions on occasions where there are potentially un-
resolved philosophical as well as interest group differences. This last case was explored sepa-
rately supra in section III.C, though there clearly are aspects of a real-world veil of ignorance 
that promote consensus through this type of effect as well. 
173. The traditional case where the legal system can impose a modified veil of ignorance is 
through constitutional amendment under article V. When the populace at large is engaged in 
constitutional decisionmaking, political actors are necessarily proceeding under some ignorance 
or imprecision - due both to the implicit agreement that constitutional provisions must be 
framed in very general terms and to their long-term prospective application. The combination 
may make it less certain exactly how the provision will be applied as well as what position the 
framers will be in when it is applied. Indeed, in some cases it may be the framers' descendants 
who are most affected by the provision, rather than the framers themselves. As a result of this 
combination of factors, it can be argued that constitutional decisionmaking, while it does have 
other liabilities noted below, may make individuals more willing to consider such issues from a 
public-regarding perspective. See, e.g., L. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution 26 (unpublished 
manuscript presented at Legal Studies Seminar, University of Pennsylvania (Jan. 26, 1989), and 
on file with author) ("Decisionmaking about a long-distance Constitution is a special kind of 
venture, one which reinforces the tendency to generalize away from one's own present time and 
circumstance to other times and circumstances; a venture, in other words, which encourages the 
generality of the moral perspective."); J. BUCHANAN & J. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CON-
SENT 78 (1962) ("uncertainty that is required in order for the individual to be led by his own 
interest to support constitutional provisions that are generally advantageous to all individuals 
and to all groups seems likely to be present at any constitutional stage of discussion"); Mueller, 
Constitutional Democracy and Social Welfare, 87 Q.J. EcoN. 60, 61 (1973) (the drafters of a 
constitutional amendment should consider the impact on all citizens and future generations); cf 
Ackerman, supra note 92, at 1171-73 (population engages in high politics when considering the 
Constitution); Elliot, Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1106-07 
(a constitutional convention would transcend politics as usual and frame the issues on a general 
and abstract level). 
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to remain in force for extended periods174 and delegation of decision-
making to administrative agencies175 can create sufficient ambiguity 
that the initial decisionmakers have difficulty in calculating the inci-
dence of costs and benefits. In these cases, the veil can be furthered 
largely by the generality of the rule that is initially adopted, making it 
unclear exactly how it will be applied. 176 The vagueness can also be 
created by ambiguity about who will enforce the rule or how they will 
enforce it (turnover in control of administrative agencies in particular 
affects both these factors), 177 and by the length of time it will be en-
forced (due to the length of time constitutional amendments and cer-
tain long-term statutes are in effect, the position of the proponents and 
other groups may change dramatically). 
174. The same analysis can be applied to authorizing legislation, or so-called back door 
spending. To the extent that legislation is general and reasonably can be expected to remain on 
the books for years to come, its longevity can have a similar type of effect on political motivation 
as a constitutional amendment. The longer the legislation is likely to stay in effect, the more it 
may impede the framers' calculation of self-interest. Of course, this argument is predicated on 
there being greater difficulty in repealing legislation. See, e.g., McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 
Strocture and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Control of Agen· 
cies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 435-40 (1989). 
175. Delegation of decisionmaking to administrative agencies can, at least in theory, offer a 
similar normative advantage. When legislation is framed in general terms, or substantive author-
ity is specifically delegated to administrative agencies, the precise application of the provision by 
the administrative agency is unclear largely because the personnel of the agency are constantly in 
flux. Thus, there is ambiguity both as to the identity of the executive officials who are subject to 
the provision and to the nature of the decisions they will make. 
Needless to say, this is relevant to both those who might become executive officials and those 
who will be subject to its structures. While law-and-economics scholars have explored delegation 
as an efficiency-enhancing (or efficiency-reducing) device in the effective implementation of pro-
grams, delegation can also shape and transform the thinking of the initial decisionmakers in 
Congress in much the same way as the requirement in administrative law that certain types of 
decisions be made through rulemaking. See Diver, supra note 74. 
176. See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 173, at 120; Bruff, supra note 28, at 221 
("A check on the fairness of selecting decision rules is the difficulty in determining who will 
profit from their later use in specific cases .... [A]t the operational stage it is much easier to 
predict the winners and losers from a change in the decision rules."). To some extent, one might 
argue that this technique creates consensus by avoidance, obscuring the existence or significance 
of problems in order to forge agreement. In this sense, it is similar to the technique of avoiding 
intractable debates through ignorance and avoidance, as described in section III.C. On the other 
hand, at least as an ideal, the technique should only obscure the incidence of costs and benefits of 
different policies, not the problems themselves. 
177. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (the incompatibility clause); J. LOCKE, THE SECOND 
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT§ 143 (J.W. Grough ed. 1966) (6th ed. 1764) ("[B]ecause it may be 
too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the same persons, who have 
the power of making laws, to have also in their hands the power to execute them, whereby they 
may exempt themselves from the obedience to the laws they make, and suit the law, both in its 
making and execution, to their own private advantage, and thereby come to have a distinct inter· 
est from the rest of the community .... "); cf. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 449-50 
(1965) (When establishing criminal liability, Congress must "set forth a generally applicable rule 
•.. and leave to the courts and juries the job of deciding what persons have committed the 
specified acts or possess the specified characteristics."). 
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B. Criticisms of This Approach 
As with all approaches to policymaking, however, the veil is sub-
ject to both philosophical and practical problems. These difficulties 
are important in appreciating when and why it may not be a useful 
technique. 
1. Philosophical Critiques 
As the philosophical criticisms of Rawls' veil of ignorance outlined 
above suggest,178 an informationally restrictive veil may undermine 
the richness of public dialogue by obscuring interests and issues. In 
order to promote a rational dialogue, civic theory generally seeks to 
expand the points of access to decisionmaking, thereby forcing govern-
ment actors to talk to and understand others' viewpoints. Knowledge 
of one's own position is critical to the clear presentation of one's 
views.179 In contrast, the theory behind a veil of ignorance appears to 
reflect a more skeptical view of human motivation and of the ability to 
encourage a true dialogue when knowledge of one's self-interest still 
exists. Its value lies in cases where (and to the extent that) the 
proliferation of information is likely to sharpen people's knowledge of 
and willingness to pursue their self-interests.180 
Law-and-economics scholars, on the other hand, may also be trou-
bled by the loss of information, though on different grounds. Law-
and-economics scholars explore the acquisition of information instru-
mentally; the question for them is ordinarily whether more expendi-
ture on information would lead to utilitarian advantages for the 
individual, or, considering externalities, for society in general. 181 
Under this approach, efficiency concerns are ordinarily treated sepa-
rately from redistributive concerns. 182 In this sense, for example, dele-
178. See M. SANDEL, supra note 54, at 122-32 (arguing one cannot know one's views or 
interests unless one is situated in a particular context); supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. 
179. Ultimately, the value of this exchange depends on the participants' abilities to evince 
empathy for other positions - a necessary predicate to the normative free dialogue that leads to 
a consensus or agreement on the normative system. Obviously, one of the main difficulties with 
this system is that it is subject to serious problems of deception and lack of empathy. 
180. Usually, a veil of ignorance is not justified on the grounds that it may serve as a welfare 
lottery. It does not improve decisionmaking or social welfare merely because people might enjoy 
their ignorance of future social positions. Rather, it changes their decisionmaking process in 
ways that should enhance (from an ethical perspective) the group social product, taking away the 
decisionmakers' sense of their own interest·in particular outcomes of the decision. Thus, the 
choice whether or not to retain such procedures is not ordinarily predicated on the risk aversion 
of the general population or their decisionmakers. See Mashaw, supra note 48, at 88 {discussing 
delegation in terms of risk aversion). Nevertheless, like Model III, it can serve that role. 
181. See supra note 22 {discussing technical and philosophical problems with the veil-of-
ignorance approach). 
182. This observation is intended as description, not criticism. Law-and-economics theory 
ordinarily views redistributive issues as a separate analytic concern. See supra note 20 {discuss-
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gation is evaluated according to whether the division of labor 
improves efficiency. 183 The purpose of the veil of ignorance, on the 
other hand, is to create a social and political incentive for individuals 
to be willing to redistribute resources or reach agreements. This is a 
question of preference formation, which law-and- economics scholars 
generally do not address. 184 It may well be that the veil will create 
inefficiencies or deadweight losses. 185 
2. Practical Problems 
Apart from these philosophical differences, attempts to create a 
real-world veil can raise serious practical problems. Because the tech-
niques for creating a real-world veil lack the precision of Rawls' heu-
ristic device, which by definition perfectly eliminated knowledge of the 
decisionmakers' place in society, the veil can be either overinclusive or 
underinclusive. 
If it is overinclusive, and too much information is eliminated, am-
biguity can create a misidentification of goals, obscure legitimate inter-
ests, and dwarf relevant problems. For example, the generality of 
constitutional decisionmaking and legislative delegation has meant 
that courts and independent agencies have often been accused of pur-
suing goals viewed as adverse to the Congress that originally passed 
the measure. 186 The frequent criticism that New Deal agencies were 
"captured" by special interest groups clearly falls into this category.1s1 
ing ideal types). See generally A.M. POLINSKY, supra note 21, at 7 ("Economists traditionally 
concentrate on how to maximize the size of the pie, leaving to others - such as legislators - the 
decision how to divide it."); id. at 10 ("For purposes of discussing the legal system, a reasonable 
simplifying assumption is that income can be costlessly redistributed."); Rose-Ackerman, supra 
note 25, at 342 (law and economics "takes wealth maximization as a first principle"). 
183. See Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 30, at 6, 27-30. 
184. To be sure, the reaching of agreements can be viewed as an issue of efficiency in the 
sense of avoiding the collective action costs of achieving consensus. 
185. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 25, at 344 (stating that welfare economics "generally 
lacks a realistic view of the working of the political process[,] ... ignoring political feasibility"). 
Indeed, one of the most important aspects of the veil - the difference principle - is inconsistent 
with the approach of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. The point is simply that in some cases inefficien-
cies may be justified as the cost of creating the political incentive for redistribution or political 
consensus. 
186. Of course, on one level, the underlying purpose of the veil is to pursue goals adverse to 
the inter!.!StS of some participants in the legislative arena. See supra notes 172-77 and accompany-
ing text. The problem is that an imperfect veil of constitutional decisionmaking can go beyond 
this, obscuring resolution of certain problems and leaving it to the courts and agency bureaucrats 
to fill in this vagueness by pursuing their own independent objectives. That certainly appears to 
be one of the current "conservative" critiques of judicial and agency usurpation. See, e.g., J. 
RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS (1989); M. SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS: JUDI· 
CIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION (1988). An earlier "liberal" generation had similar 
problems with the hold-over New Deal Court. See A. BICKEL, supra note 91, at 90. 
187. See M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 163, at 86-87. 
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On the other hand, if the veil is underinclusive, too little informa-
tion may be excised, allowing some but not all political actors to pierce 
the veil. For example, to the extent there is not turnover in the groups 
to which a statutory or constitutional requirement applies and to the 
extent its impact is clear, the extended length of time it is expected to 
be in effect can exacerbate divisions and increase attempts at rent-seek-
ing. This would occur, for example, as groups such as pro- or anti-
abortion advocates fight "to the death." Due to the clarity of the issue 
and its long-term impact, they continue to battle rather than compro-
mise.188 Similarly, to the extent that only a subgroup can foresee the 
impact of a rule, as in the case of some delegations to administrative 
agencies, the veil may increase social differences, as some advantaged 
groups use it as a mechanism to appropriate social resources to 
themselves.189 
These trade-offs can be seen in a variety of different public law 
debates. For example, a great deal of academic paper has been con-
sumed criticizing backdoor budget authority. In an attempt to pro-
mote instrumental rationality, many have criticized such budgeting on 
the ground that it avoids yearly analysis of the costs of programs. In 
addition, the use of different funding devices (backdoor versus ordi-
nary appropriation statutes) can further fiscal illusion, according to 
this line of reasoning, by hiding the true costs of programs.190 
Nevertheless, backdoor budget authority, as opposed to yearly ap-
propriation statutes or other time-limited legislation, can provide a 
normative advantage in some respects. An appropriation statute is 
limited to one year only, and thus will generally have an impact only 
for that limited time. Those voting for the particular item are more 
likely to know precisely who will or will not benefit from the legisla-
tion. In contrast, an authorization bill, or a bill granting backdoor 
budget authority, lasts in perpetuity, unless Congress can overcome 
inertia and repeal it. In areas where Congress can expect to see a large 
turnover in the groups or institutions that will be subject to the partic-
188. See, e.g .• J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LoST THE ERA 194 (1986) (defeat of ERA was a 
result of "[t]rying to legislate a broad principle through the constitutional amendment process";• 
"basic issues were at stake" and "the final result had to be victory for one side and defeat for the 
other"); Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & 
ECON. 875, 879 (1975); Macey, supra note 25, at 52 (stating that according to law-and-economics 
theorists "special interest groups place an especially high value on constitutional rules, because 
such rules are harder to repeal and therefore more durable than ordinary legislation"). 
189. See infra notes 208-09 and accompanying text. For an effort to explain administrative 
procedures in terms of assisting different groups in monitoring bureaucracies, see McCubbins, 
Noll, & Weingast, supra note 36. 
190. Cf Goetz, Fiscal Illusion in State and Local Finance, in BUDGETS AND BUREAUCRATS: 
THE SOURCES OF GOVERNMENT GROWTH 176, 177 (T. Borcherding ed. 1977). 
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ular restriction or statutory limitation, these bills may create some 
greater incentive for Congress to reach a greater level of consensus and 
equality. Such areas include limitations on the executive branch, rules 
about the procedures of Congress, and overall levels of taxation. 191 
The reason for this incentive is that more groups will potentially be 
subject to the limitation.192 
Indeed, this is the type of technique that Congress used to reach 
agreement on budget cuts in the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
Control Act of 1985, popularly known as Gramm-Rudman-Hol-
lings.193 By setting budget targets years ahead, the precise incidence 
of budget reductions was less predictable to the Congress that origi-
nally passed the measure. In effect, ignorance about specific outcomes 
can help forge a consensus and create a disincentive against the singu-
lar pursuit of narrow group advantage, at least ex ante. 194 
A similar debate has occurred regarding the early law-and-eco-
nomics argument, advanced originally by Landes and Posner, that the 
long-term enforceability of statutes by independent courts facilitated 
rent-seeking by ensuring that deals would continue to push benefits in 
perpetuity to the narrow group which originally secured passage of the 
legislation. 195 Under the early law-and-economics view, the longer the 
statute's existence, the more likely it was to facilitate rent-seeking by 
narrow groups, and to heighten political divisions. This is due to the 
greater discounted benefit to their present political activity. To the 
191. See infra section IV.C.1. As noted above, this argument is predicated on the greater 
difficulty in repealing legislation. See supra note 174. 
192. Another example can be found in the events surrounding the original passage of the 
income tax during the Civil War. After Congress was unable to increase traditional property 
taxes, the effects of which would have been perfectly clear, agreement was ultimately reached on 
an income tax, largely because the effect of the then-novel tax on different constituencies was 
unknown. See J. Alt, The Evolution of Tax Structures 36-50 (1982) (unpublished manuscript on 
file with author). 
193. Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-22 (1988)). 
194. While such programs may be less "efficient" than lump-sum distributions, they can 
create the political will to redistribute or reach agreements. For similar reasons, a variety of 
internal legislative rules can be viewed as attempts to erect veils of ignorance over legislative 
activity, helping to promote consensus. For example, the rules of procedure for each Congress 
are set by the prior Congress and can be amended only through intervention, sometimes requir-
ing super-majorities, at the beginning of that Congress. The system has been the subject of some 
academic criticism on the grounds that each new Congress should generate independently, or at 
least be able to repeal through majority vote, all of its rules each term. See Eule, Temporal 
Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FoOND. RES. 
J. 379, 407-12, 425 n.215. Because legislative procedure is ordinarily agreed upon at a time when 
participants are less clear about the effect of the rules on their interests, however, they may be 
less likely to consider marginal instrumental advantages and, therefore, more likely to reach a 
consensus. 
195. See Landes & Posner, supra note 188. 
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extent that the future application of the provision is clear, and the 
position of the proponents static, this analysis seems persuasive. 
In cases where the groups subject to the limitation might change 
over time, however, such statutes may be less likely to promote nar-
row, interest group rent-seeking, and more likely to further general 
agreement and redistribution, since the group can no longer be assured 
that it will be in a position to benefit from the statute. 196 The clearest 
examples, as outlined below, are statutes limiting executive powers 
where party control of the executive branch is expected to change over 
time, or broad, all-encompassing tax statutes. In such cases, in periods 
of rapid turnover and long-term application, there may be some 
greater likelihood of reaching a consensus and less likelihood that ac-
tors will pursue their narrow marginal advantage at the cost of a 
broader societal benefit.197 
C. Separation-of-Powers Problems: A Case Study in the Value of 
the Veil and Political Parties 
While a veil can be generally useful in these various ways, it is 
important to appreciate that a properly functioning two-party system 
can also be quite successful in establishing its own type of macro-polit-
ical veil of ignorance. As noted above, delegation to administrative 
agencies may create a veil through different techniques of constitu-
tional and statutory decisionmaking, helping sometimes to forge a 
political consensus and overcoming the advantages of special int(;'.rest 
groups. A briefreview of the history of separation-of-powers confron-
tations suggests that political parties have been important in this pro-
cess. Conversely, their breakdown has had a negative impact on those 
relations. The consensus and breakdown can be seen in two different 
contexts- (1) control of the presidency and Congress, and (2) control 
of executive agencies. " 
1. Control of the Presidency and Congress 
For much of the past one hundred years, the American political 
system has been heavily influenced by two political parties that each 
had the potential over time to capture any or all of the political 
branches. 198 When one party was dominant for a brief period, more-
over, it was usually able to control all branches of government. In 
196. See supra note 173 (discussion of constitutional change in self-interest). 
197. See infra section IV.C.l. 
198. The following discussion draws heavily upon B. Ginsburg & M. Shefter, Political Par-
ties, Electoral Conflict, and Institutional Combat (unpublished manuscript on file with the au-
thor). See also B. GINSBURG & M. SHEFfER, supra note 133. 
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such an environment, individual politicians and political parties did 
not ordinarily envision their interests as necessarily connected or 
linked to the power of any one institution. While there clearly were 
constitutional crises between branches during this period, it was not 
demonstrably in the interest of a particular party or politician to con-
centrate power in any one institution - especially in a constitutional 
sense - since the party might later be excluded from this power 
center. In effect, a veil of ignorance existed in both statutory and con-
stitutional debates regarding the likely beneficiary of institutional pow-
ers. As compared to today, there also was generally more agreement 
over the extent of constitutional authority vested in executive and leg-
islative officials. 
In recent years, especially since 1968, however, this fluidity has 
changed. Because of the decline of political parties and a variety of 
other historical reasons, no party has recently been able to dominate 
both branches simultaneously. To the extent there has been influence, 
moreover, the Democratic party has had greater control of the legisla-
tive branch during this period, and the Republican party has more 
often controlled the presidency. 199 Indeed, given the incumbency ad-
vantage in Congress, and the Republicans' recent advantage in presi-
dential elections, most current political actors seem to expect that the 
pattern will continue. One result of this situation is that the parties 
and individual politicians now tend to envision their political interests 
as tied to the particular institution that they inhabit and to the en-
hancement of the statutory and constitutional powers of that institu-
tion. 200 No longer need Democrats fear that reduced presidential 
powers will block a modem Franklin Roosevelt; or Republicans fear 
that enhanced executive powers will serve as the engine for a new New 
Deal revolution~ This has been accompanied, not surprisingly, by a 
resurgence in separation-of-powers confrontations between the presi-
dent and the legislative branch. These include battles over legislative 
199. See Ferejohn & Fiorina, Incumbency and Realignment in Congressional Elections, in 
THE NEW DIRECTION lN AMERICAN POLlTICS 115 (J. Chubb & P. Peterson ed. 1985) (noting 
the decreased association between presidential and congressional voting and the electorate's 
seeming preference for a Republican in the White House); Fiorina, supra note 85 (documenting 
the history of divided government and its possible explanations); Clymer, Political Terrain Seen 
as Changing, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1989, at 27, col. 1 (discussing reasons for increasing Republi-
can control of the presidency and Democratic control of the Congress). While many have specu-
lated on the reasons for our present divided government, there is probably no generally accepted 
explanation. 
200. This appears to be a result of the institutionally specific control of parties as well as the 
general breakdown of parties. For, with the general breakdown of parties and the rising indepen-
dence of politicians, even if formal political control of the branches did change, it is uncertain 
whether individual politicians would see their interests as tied to other branches that they indi-
vidually would be unlikely to control. 
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vetoes,201 legislative oversight, executive privilege,202 executive foreign 
policy independence,203 and judicial and executive nominations.204 In 
the aggregate, these seem unusual in our political history.205 
While there probably are a variety of social and economic reasons 
for this resurgence, one additional explanation is that the veil of igno-
rance over the institutional position of political interests and actors 
has been lowered. Constitutional and statutory debates over institu-
tional powers no longer occur behind a veil that protects the identity 
of the political participants. For the foreseeable future, it seems likely 
that strong legislative influence will be tied to the interests of the Dem-
ocratic Party and strong presidential power to the Republican Party. 
The loss in fluidity - the lowering of the veil - has undermined 
political agreements over the constitutional and statutory powers of 
the separate branches. 206 
201. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 969-74 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (outlining the 
consensus that used to exist between Congress and the executive over the necessity and propriety 
of the legislative veto); B. CRAIG, CHADHA.: THE STORY OF AN EPIC CONSTITUTIONAL STRUG-
GLE 36, 106-07, 160 (1988) (discussing acquiescence of the executive branch to the legislative 
veto prior to the explosion of its use in the 1970s, and the Justice Department's opposition to the 
legislative veto under the Carter and Reagan administrations); Breyer, The Legislative Veto After 
Chadha, 72 GEO. L.J. 785, 787 (1984) (suggesting that the legislative veto acted as a compromise 
on many separation-of-powers issues). For a detailed account of the history of the legislative 
veto, including the consensus on its use in the 1930s, see generally B. CRAIG, THE LEGISLATIVE 
VETO: CoNGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF REGULATION 15-43 (1983). 
202. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699-701 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (detailing 
recent confrontation over executive privilege); Olson, The Impetuous Vortex: Congressional Ero-
sion of Presidential Authority, in THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY: LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH 231-42 (L. Crovitz & J. Rabkin eds. 1989) [hereinafter THE FETTERED 
PRESIDENCY] (cataloguing congressionat "encroachments" on supposedly traditional executive 
powers). 
203. See generally Koh, Why The President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons 
of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1259-73 (1988) (faulting the special congressional 
committee established to investigate the Iran-Contra scandal for not trying to understand the 
incident as part of the post-Vietnam breakdown of the consensus between the executive and 
Congress on foreign affairs). 
204. See Totenberg, The Confirmation Process And The Public: To Know or Not to Know, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 1213 (1988) (contrasting the confrontation over the Bork nomination with 
the previous confirmation process for Supreme Court Justices); Chopping Down the President, 
Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 1989, at AlO, col. 1 (suggesting a breakdown of bipartisanship on executive 
appointments concerning foreign affairs). 
205. See generally B. Ginsburg & M. Shefter, supra note 198; Monaghan, The Confirmation 
Process! Law or Politics, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202 (1988); Totenberg, supra note 204; Chopping 
Down the President, supra note 204, at AlO, col. 1 (discussing Tower nomination). For this 
reason, claims that institutional arguments need not be influenced by predictions of political 
effect can be hazardous. See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 462-63 ("[T)here is no necessary connec-
tion between antiregulatory politics and executive control. In a different administration, execu-
tive centralization might have the opposite result."). Obviously, this can be a common problem 
in debates over institutional choice. See Hirshman, Postmodern Jurisprudence and the Problem 
of Administrative Discretion, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 646, 665-66 n.134 (1988) (discussing charges of 
political bias in other institutional competence debates). 
206. To public choice theorists, this breakdown of cooperation is familiar: it is analogous to 
the public choice problem of maintaining cooperative behavior once the point of the end of the 
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2. Control of Government Bureaucracy 
The second way in which the veil has been pierced can be seen in 
the oversight by congressional committees of agency implementation 
of statutes. As several political scientists have detailed, delegation 
often imposes a veil of ignorance about congressional actions upon the 
diffuse public, but less so upon specially interested groups.207 In par-
ticular, according to this view, when the costs of programs are diffuse 
and the benefits concentrated, delegation of authority to administra-
tive agencies can serve as a mechanism through which committees in 
Congress, and their associated constituencies and special interest 
groups, can hide many of the costs from the diffuse public, while pur-
suing their interests in the program at the agency implementation 
stage.2os 
To support this observation, some scholars have shown the infor-
mal control individual committees of Congress often have over execu-
tive administration. Because these committees frequently favor the 
interests of narrow interest groups, delegation has sometimes been 
thought to erect a veil around the general public that nevertheless al-
lows congressional committees and special interest groups greater abil-
ity to affect the ultimate outcome through informal oversight of the 
agencies.209 The veil of ignorance implicit in delegation can thus be 
asymmetric, potentially exacerbating the informational advantages of 
special interest groups. 
To the extent that this process has occurred, our ability to reach 
agreements on the appropriate internal structures of the executive 
game is known, and is not distant. Tit-for-tat strategies are not successful once the end of the 
game is imminent. See R. HARDIN, supra note 14, at 145-50. Similarly, here, knowledge that the 
institutional position of political parties and members is relatively certain creates incentives for 
politicians to defect from cooperative strategies, since the opportunity for retaliation is 
minimized. · 
207. See, e.g., Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administra-
tive Process, 39 Pus. CHOICE 33, 53-54 (1982); Fiorina, Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Con-
trol and the Delegatio,n of Legislative Power, 2 J.L. & EcoN. 33, 49 (1986) [hereinafter Fiorinn, 
Legislator Uncertainty]; Weingast, The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal Agent 
Perspective, 44 Pub. Choice 147, 181-82 (1984); Weingast & Moran, The Myth of Runaway Bu-
reaucracy- The Case of the FTC. REGULATION, May-June 1982, at 33, 37-38. But see Moe, An 
Assessment of the Positive Theory of Congressional Dominance, 12 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 475 (1987) 
(questioning the'Congressional dominance theory). 
208. See sources cited in note 207. See also Bruff, supra note 28, at 230; B. GINSBURG & M. 
SHEFrER, supra note 133, at 176-77. For an explanation of the establishment of agency proce-
dures and information structures primarily in terms of furthering the interests of the different 
groups lobbying for the original legislation, see McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, supra note 36. Of 
course, congressional oversight was originally seen as, and in some respects still is, a check on 
agency capture. See note 215. The evidence now is that it may facilitate some forms of capture, 
though the extent of congressional influence is still the subject of intensive debate. See, e.g., Moe, 
supra note 207. 
209. See Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 30, at 7; Pierce, supra note 48, at 483. 
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branch may also have been affected. As time has elapsed, and the in-
formal control has become apparent to political actors, debates over 
the statutory and constitutional powers of independent agencies and 
the bureaucracy of executive departments may have been exacerbated 
for the same reasons that led to the separation-of-powers confronta-
tions described above.210 With political control over both the presi-
dency and Congress fairly clear, presidential authority over these 
agencies means, as a practical matter, greater Republican control. 
Agency autonomy, on the other hand, with congressional oversight, 
often means greater Democratic control. Like constitutional and stat-
utory debates on the separation of powers, divisions over the control 
and structure of the executive branch are now clearer and more 
politicized.211 
In light of this history, it is apparent that ignorance has advantages 
and that important political costs are created by the greater certainty 
of political position. In the past, passage of long-term statutes or ac-
ceptance of informal agreements on executive and legislative powers 
often created fewer divisions because there was the distinct possibility 
of both executive and legislative turnover. With the decline of a com-
petitive two-party system, this greater ability to reach political agree-
ment over legitimate institutional powers has diminished. A veil that 
would ideally help equalize political influence and facilitate political 
agreements does not exist. 
3. Future Reforms 
While there is no obvious solution to this complicated situation, it 
is important to recognize that many past and proposed reforms in the 
civic virtue tradition, whatever their other values, may exacerbate this 
210. For a discussion of the constitutionality of independent agencies, see generally Synar v. 
United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1398 (D.D.C. 1986) (asserting the difficulty of reconciling the 
holding in Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), with separation of pow-
ers); Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. Cr. REV. 41, 96-97; Scalia, Historical Anomalies in 
Administrative Law, 1985 SUP. Cr. HIST. SocY. 103, 106-10. The debate over executive depart-
ment autonomy has occurred with respect to the regulatory orders in the Reagan administration. 
See Exec. Ord. 12291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982); and Executive 
Order 12498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
For commentary on the degree to which the White House exercises or should exercise power 
over rulemaking by the Office of Management and Budget, see, for example, DeMuth & Gins-
burg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986); Morrison, 
OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. 
L. REV. 1059 (1986). 
211. In light of this analysis, the value of high level government commissions as a decision-
making device can be appreciated. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text. While dele-
gation of decisionmaking to the president or an administrative agency can be suspect for the 
reasons outlined above, a commission can be made balanced in its membership. In effect, by 
combining the membership of the separate branches, it can recreate the veil of institutional 
position. 
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effect.212 As discussed above, civic virtue theory favors stimulating a 
rich and diverse dialogue about administrative issues through "prolif-
erating points of access" to administrative decisionmaking. Courts, 
the president, Congress, and perhaps the public generally are all sup-
posed to become more involved in administrative decisions.213 Pro-
moting mechanisms that facilitate legislative, presidential, and judicial 
participation should not only stimulate dialogue, but should also re-
duce the comparative advantage of special interest groups through a 
type of competitive oversight.214 
While there is much to be said on behalf of these changes,215 espe-
cially given the necessity for broad delegations of authority today, as a 
totality they can further exacerbate the breakdown of the veil, as issues 
are increasingly fought out within the executive branch on a case-by-
case basis, ex post. Instead of debates on institutional powers being 
made behind a "veil," real decisionmaking for the most part is delayed 
and transformed into a bargaining process within the executive branch 
on an issue-by-issue basis. Moreover, in recent years, these debates 
have probably become increasingly protracted due to the greater polit-
ical independence and security of political actors, especially members 
of Congress21 6 - an independance that civic virtue theory would seem 
to applaud as the structural precondition to a diverse and rich public 
212. One solution, put forward by some scholars, is to abandon the veil altogether. See 
Aranson, Gellhom & Robinson, supra note 30; see also T. Low1, supra note 35. According to 
this analysis, courts should reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine and produce greater specific· 
ity in statutes. Obviously this would avoid some of the perverse effects of legislation oversight, 
but might throw the baby out with the bath water. See Mashaw, supra note 48. 
213. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. In order to ensure this dialogue, over-
sight from all of these institutions is supposed to be enhanced, with information about executive 
agencies disclosed through the Freedom of Information Act, the government in the Sunshine 
Act, legislative oversight, and enhanced judicial review under the hard-look doctrine. 
214. These proposals are based in part on the old New Deal model of special interest group 
influence, where power was supposed to have been exercised behind closed doors between bu· 
reaucrats and interest group representatives. See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 450 ("Agency au· 
tonomy, in short, has often served not as a guarantor of neutral administration, but as a source of 
vulnerability to the pressure of well-organized groups."). 
215. See Bruff, supra note 28, at 210, 248 (concluding that the approach "acknowledge(s] 
political influence and concentrate[s] on ensuring that it [is] openly and fairly exercised"; "[t]he 
widespread access to policymaking processes that the agencies are required to provide fosters 
compromise, ... ensuring that public policy will be supported by coalitions representing a set of 
values that is relatively widely accepted"); Fiorina, Legislator Uncertainty, supra note 207, at 49 
(increasing proceduralization of administrative agencies after late 1960s consistent with "legisla-
tors trying to counter increasingly evident biases in the administrative processes"); cf. Mccub-
bins & Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 2 AM. 
J. POL. Sci. 165 (1984) (discussing information proliferation as helping to solve principal/agency 
problems of Congress); McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, supra note 36 (same). 
216. There is a now voluminous literature on the congressional incumbency effect - espe· 
cially in the House of Representatives. See, e.g., Ferejohn & Fiorina, supra note 199, at 91-117; 
Fiorina, supra note 141, at 37-39. 
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dialogue.217 In this environment, however, independence and the cer-
tainty of position may undermine the ability to reach agreements on 
institutional powers. In short, efforts to stimulate dialogue and "vi-
ture" under a civic virtue philosophy may be in tension with a "veil of 
ignorance" approach. 
At the same time, there is also some question about the extent to 
which the civic virtue proposals will actually minimize the influence of 
special interest groups. The theory behind this view is that the in-
creased spotlight of competitive checking and participation after dele-
gation will minimize the back-door, behind-the-scenes "deals" that 
inspired the common criticisms of the traditional New Deal agency.218 
In many cases this is undoubtedly true, as administrative deci-
sionmakers respond over the short run to potential exposure.219 Over-
all, however, the increased complexity of the process can, for the 
reasons discussed above in Part III, have another effect on the public 
at large, especially on an electoral level: advantaging specialized con-
stituencies that have a greater ability to untangle the complexity of 
administrative dialogue and inputs, while disadvantaging the diffuse 
public, which does not know whom to hold accountable, especially in 
its electoral judgments.220 The ultimate effect on systemic political ac-
countability can be quite complicated. 
The traditional political party model, on the other hand, would 
offer a quite different perspective on these problems. It would likely 
seek to deemphasize informational access to the initial formulation 
and implementatiqn of executive programs in particular cases by erect-
ing more informational barriers to executive agencies. As one scholar 
discussing this policy has observed, increases in congressional over-
sight can "inhibit[ ] democratic control of policy and administration of 
an idealized sort - coherent, coordinated programmatic in the re-
sponsible parties sense."221 The "very system feature (disciplined, 
217. See Sunstein, supra note 87, at 31-38; Farber & Frickey, supra note 87, at 912 n.224; 
Tushnet, Schneider & Kovner, Judicial Review and Congressional Tenure: An Observation, 66 
TEXAS L. REV. 967 (1988). 
218. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
219. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
220. See W. BURNHAM, Shifting Patterns of Congressional Voting Participation 1981, in THE 
CURRENT CRISIS IN AMERICAN PoLmCS 196 (1982) (observing that the mass electorate is "baf-
fled by the complexity of our constitutional arrangements, has extremely low levels of informa-
tion, and has not been educated by any social instrumentality . . . to an understanding of 
politics") (emphasis omitted}; cf Bruff, supra note 28, at 247 (noting that with the increase in 
inputs to the administrative process, "[t)he very multiplicity of competing actors suggests that no 
one of them will attain effective control .... Consequently, an administrator usually has discre-
tion in shaping policy."). 
221. J. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL 
OVERSIGHT 212 (1990). 
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centralized decisionmaking) that seems to enhance the accountability 
of decisionmakers to the public may [be consistent with a] restrict[ed] 
role of legislative bodies in oversight."222 Thus, this approach might 
well be more sympathetic toward increased presidential power over 
certain . nationwide agency operations, while legislative oversight 
would be more limited at the initial stages. A variety of reforms such 
as some limitations on legislative oversight,223 simultaneous transmis-
sion of agency budgets and other information to Congress,224 and 
greater review by the Office of Management and Budget of major 
agency action and legislation, falls into this category.225 While there 
are constitutional impediments to a full implementation of any party 
approach, which in its extreme form runs contrary to checks and bal-
ances, the goal would be to make the president more responsible for 
and accountable to the public for agency decisions. 
Unfortunately, this approach can succeed, even on a modest basis, 
only if we have an accountable president and truly strong, competitive 
parties to recreate the veil.226 To the extent that we continue to have 
weak parties, each controlling a separate branch of government, cen-
tralized executive authority creates legitimate concerns of tyranny, 
one-party control of .executive decisions, and substantially reduced 
public dialogue and public participation. 
Given this potential tension between legal participation and polit-
ical accountability, we need to recognize that there are costs to a sin-
222. Id. at 211. In short, "the more centralized and coordinated that authority in govern-
ment becomes, the less likely it is that the legislative body will be an active overseer of policy and 
administration." Id. at 209; see also Bruff, supra note 28, at 233 ("the President lacks strong 
incentives to intervene in regulation because he bears only attenuated political responsibility for 
decisions made in the agencies"). As Donald Horowitz has observed of the presidency: 
Cautioning against a plural executive, Hamilton, in The Federalist, warned that a prolifera-
tion of personnel would make personal accountability for executive misdeeds difficult to 
establish. It would deprive the public of the "opportunity of discovering with facility and 
clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to [achieve] their removal 
from office, or [] their actual punishment in cases which admit of it." In public psychology 
and in legal conception, we have the unitary executive of the Framers; in the difficulty of 
tracing responsibility and in the accompanying immobilism, we have something closer to the 
plural executive they rejected. 
Horowitz, Is the Presidency Failing?, 88 Pua. INT. 3, 20 (1987). 
223. See generally THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY, supra note 202. 
224. See, e.g., 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 632 (1982). 
225. See supra note 210. As Aberbach has noted, "the vecy discipline and electoral account-
ability of a democratic system with effectively centralized and coordinated authority over policy 
and administration is more than compatible with a restricted legislative role in oversight." J, 
ABERBACH, supra note 221, at 210; see also Bruff, supra note 28, at 233 ("centralized review of 
regulations can help the President check policy that may result from agency alliances with con-
gressional committees or interest groups, enhancing his power against those forces"); Weingast, 
Regulation, Reregulation, and Deregulation: The Political Foundations of Agency Clientele Rela-
tionships, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1981, at 147, 159. 
226. As discussed above, we do not at the moment. See supra section III.D. 
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gular pursuit of the civic virtue approach. Many past and future 
reforms in administrative law, whatever their other benefits, may also 
undermine our ability to reach agreements on government powers and 
may have a mixed value for diffuse constituencies. In this situation, 
attempts to limit disclosure in some narrow areas, such as the formula-
tion of the executive branch regulatory agenda, coupled with enhanced 
presidential oversight, may serve to further political accountability.227 
At the same time, these changes would need to be accompanied by 
stronger, more competitive political parties, as outlined in Part III, to 
ensure that the veil implicit in legislative delegation would be main-
tained and that centralized control would not lead to an institutional 
advantage for one political ideology. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this article, which some might view as an exercise 
in intellectual arbitrage between law and political science, has been to 
explore the paradox implicit in some traditional writings on political 
parties: that political institutions have in some areas performed better 
with less information. This anomaly should be especially significant to 
legal scholars, since two prominent legal intellectual models - civic 
virtue and law and economics - often view greater information and 
political communications as the solution to current problems. These 
benefits include stimulating greater normative evaluation of public 
decisionmaking as well as promoting more responsible and efficient 
government. 
As this article has suggested, however, less information and re-
duced communications have been beneficial in some contexts, both 
normatively and instrumentally. In the past, the shaping and narrow-
ing of political information through the organization of political par-
ties and party identification has in some respects improved the ability 
of the public to understand, make sense of, and ·control political 
events. The accountability of individual political representatives to 
group activities through party identification has also limited the influ-
ence of interest groups. With the breakdown of parties and party iden-
tification, on the other hand, the entrepreneurial ability of independent 
political actors to gain support in their districts has been one of the 
causes of political universalism, affecting the allocation of social 
resources. 
In addition, as a normative matter, vagueness in legislative delega-
tion has sometimes improved deliberative processes and furthered 
227. See Strauss, supra note 48, at 666. 
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political consensus by limiting the ability of political actors to calcu-
late the specific costs and benefits of government policy on their own 
interest. Indeed, in some cases, delaying the discussion of problems, in 
the spirit of nonideological parties, has facilitated agreement, espe-
cially in the budget and party context, thereby improving govern-
ment's ability to act. In short, contrary to the usual presumption, less 
information can improve normative as well as instrumental objectives 
in some arenas, and thus should be considered as part of general policy 
analysis. 
Despite this benefit, the resolution of current policy issues is surely 
not to adopt general or even major restrictions on information. As 
law-and-economics and civic virtue scholars have persuasively demon-
strated, information is an important resource for social progress.228 
Rather, I have speculated on how some institutions might be restruc-
tured to shape the dissemination of information, consistent with the 
insights of the political party perspective. These changes, which high-
light the trade-offs raised by many current public law strategies, would 
seek to improve the informational capacities of centralized institutions 
such as parties, while implicitly diminishing those of individual polit-
ical actors. The purpose is to further governmental and social consen-
sus, innovation, and responsibility, broadly conceived. 
228. Moreover, the fact that less information may have been beneficial does not suggest we 
should risk affirmatively empowering government officials to impose restrictions. 
